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Negotiating Points in Second Lien Financing Transactions
C. Edward Dobbs*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes some of the more significant issues faced by
the senior working capital lender ("First Lien Lender") in negotiating
intercreditor agreements with a provider of so-called second lien term
loans (the "Second Lien Lender"). Typically, the Second Lien Lender
is a non-regulated private investor, such as a hedge fund, mezzanine
fund or specialized finance company, that is engaged in the business of
making junior secured "stretch" loans in leveraged financing transac-
tions.1 Although the lien securing the Second Lien Lender's loan is
subordinate in priority to the liens of the First Lien Lender in the
assets of the borrower, the term loan of the Second Lien Lender (the
"Second Lien Loan") is not subordinated in right of payment to the
indebtedness owed to the First Lien Lender.2 The Second Lien
Lender predicates the amount of the Second Lien Lender upon the
perceived "enterprise value" of the borrower's business, which ordina-
rily can be realized only from a going concern sale of the business
after default. 3
* ©2006 C. Edward Dobbs. All rights reserved. The author is a partner in the Atlanta office
of the law firm of Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs LLP.
1. In many second lien financing transactions, the loan provided by the Second Lien Lender is
utilized by the borrower to fill the gap between what an asset-based lender is prepared to lend
against the collateral and the additional liquidity needed by the borrower, whether for operating
capital purposes, consummation of a leveraged buyout or the funding of a dividend to an equity
sponsor.
2. This distinction between a lien subordination and a debt (or payment) subordination is
important to comprehend. In the former, the Second Lien Lender is generally not authorized to
receive and retain any proceeds of collateral securing the Second Lien Loan until the indebted-
ness owed to the First Lien Lender is fully satisfied. However, after the collateral has been
exhausted, any remaining claims of the First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender would be on
equal footing and would share ratably as unsecured creditors in distributions in a bankruptcy
case. In a debt subordination, the junior creditor is not authorized to receive and retain any
payment (except for certain mutually agreed upon pre-default debt services) until the senior
debt is paid in full. See generally, C. Edward Dobbs, Debt Subordination in HOWARD RUDA,
ASSET-BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE, Ch. 13 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005).
3. The Second Lien Lender's assessment of "enterprise value" may be based upon a multiple
of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) or the Second Lien
Lender's assessment of the going concern value of the collateral. If the Second Lien Lender is a
so-called cash-flow lender, the Second Lien Lender may determine its pricing, the amount of its
190 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:189
The market for second lien loans has mushroomed from less than $1
billion in 2002, to $12 billion in 2004 and almost $10 billion in the first
half of 2005. 4 A variety of factors account for this substantial increase
in the availability of second lien loans, including the ready availability
of capital that can be employed at higher returns in highly leveraged
transactions. However, there have been relatively few reported deci-
sions in bankruptcy cases involving disputes between the First Lien
Lender and Second Lien Lender and their relative rights in a bank-
ruptcy case. It is anticipated that many borrowers that have obtained
second lien financings will have little, if any, equity in their assets
available for unsecured creditors. Indeed, in many instances, it is pre-
dictable that the Second Lien Lender's claims will be substantially un-
dersecured. As a result, the Second Lien Lender can be expected to
use the leverage obtained by virtue of its junior lien position to extract
concessions from the borrower or First Lien Lender in a bankruptcy
or loan workout context. The documentation of the relative rights of
the First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender, therefore takes on
increased importance.5
Second Lien Loan and the financial covenants to be included in the documentation based upon
forecasted EBITDA of the borrower. If, on the other hand, the Second Lien Lender is more
reliant upon the asset base of the borrower, it will likely derive the amount that it is willing to
lend based upon its assessment of the going concern value of the borrower's assets (i.e., the
amount that would be obtained in a sale of the borrower's entire business as a going concern).
The cash-flow Second Lien Lender and the asset-reliant Second Lien Lender will have differing
perspectives on many of the issues confronted in intercreditor agreements that they negotiate
with First Lien Lenders. The cash-flow Second Lien Lender will be sensitive to negative vari-
ances in actual EBITDA compared with forecasted EBITDA of the borrower and will want to
act quickly to protect itself in a downward spiral of the borrower's business. The asset-reliant
Second Lien Lender, however, may not be quite so concerned with actual financial performance
and more concerned with asset levels in the value of the overall enterprise, including intangible
assets (such as patents, trademarks, tradenames and trade secrets).
4. See Colin P. Cross, Second Lien Market-Syndicated vs. Book and Hold, ABF J., Nov./
Dec. 2005, at 10; Richard M. Bochicchio, Lender Acceptance Fuels Explosion in Second-Lien
Market, J. CORP. RENEWAL, May 2005, available at http://www.backbayfund.com/news/pdf/
RB%20Journal%20of%2OCorp.%20story%205-05.pdf.
5. Until recently, banks and other traditional financing sources had exhibited hostility towards
the idea of allowing second liens to be granted by their borrowers on collateral securing the
claims of such lenders. The reasons prompting this reluctance to agree to second liens were
several. First, under the U.C.C., a secured party disposing of collateral owes a non-waivable
duty of commercial reasonableness not only to the borrower but also to other secured parties.
See U.C.C.§ 9-602(7) (2005); Id. § 9-610(b). In addition, the existence of a junior security inter-
est can significantly decrease a senior secured party's flexibility in managing its collateral, both in
and out of bankruptcy. As will be discussed in later paragraphs in the text, a junior secured
creditor in bankruptcy has a whole host of rights, which, if asserted, can substantially delay im-
plementation of action agreed upon by the debtor and the senior secured party, increase the cost
of the case and reduce the certainty of outcome of a variety of strategies that would be otherwise
more certain. In those occasions when the senior secured party gave its consent to the grant of a
second lien upon the collateral, the senior secured party generally conditioned such consent
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In some second lien financings, the Second Lien Lender requests
that the Second Lien Loan be included in and dealt with under the
credit agreement between the First Lien Lender and the borrower.
On occasion, the use of a common credit agreement is thought to be
prudent due to the presence of a so-called "anti-layering" provision in
high yield debt documents to which the borrower is a party and by
which the borrower is prohibited from incurring any indebtedness that
is senior in right of payment to the subordinated debt but junior to the
borrower's senior secured credit facility.6 The use of a single credit
agreement for loans made by the First Lien Lender and Second Lien
Lender presents a number of documentation challenges and raises sig-
nificant legal issues, which are beyond the scope of this article. 7 The
more common approach is to require the Second Lien Loan to be
separately documented and the liens granted to the Second Lien
Lender to be the subject of an intercreditor agreement 8 with the First
Lien Lender.
In some second lien transactions, the Second Lien Lender will have
a senior lien on its own "primary collateral" as security for the Second
Lien Loan (such collateral usually consisting of fixed assets of the bor-
rower) and a junior lien (behind the First Lien Lender's liens) on
working capital assets. In those transactions, the First Lien Lender
retains a first priority lien on the working capital assets, with the par-
ties left to negotiate the relative priorities of their liens on general
upon the execution of a stringent intercreditor agreement that "neutered" many of the rights
and remedies of the junior secured party, with result that such junior liens came to be known as
"silent seconds." With the substantial increase in the volume of second lien loans and their
increased importance to the marketplace, second lien lenders are no longer mute and, in some
instances, have roared like lions.
6. Such "anti-layering" provisions can sometimes be construed to prohibit only the borrower's
incurrence of debt that is subordinate in right of payment to the senior secured credit facility and
not to prohibit the incurrence of non-subordinated debt financings that are secured by a second
lien.
7. In addition to significant drafting issues on voting rights under a shared credit agreement,
such an agreement may give rise to an argument that the claims of the First Lien Lender and
Second Lien Lender, to the extent secured by a common lien in favor of the collateral agent, are
to be viewed as a unified secured claim. To the extent that that unified secured claim exceeds
the value of the collateral, the consequence in a bankruptcy case of the borrower may be that the
claim of the First Lien Lender will not be entitled, under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
to accrue or be paid post-petition interest or expenses incurred in the bankruptcy case. See In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 528 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). Some counsel for First Lien Lend-
ers believe that this problem can be obviated by having separate grants of security interests and
other liens (perhaps to separate collateral agents) for the benefit of the First Lien Lender and
Second Lien Lender, with the intended result that there are clearly separate secured claims.
8. In transactions involving multiple parties, or in bond or public note transactions, the parties
may select an independent collateral trustee and provide for the documentation of the first,
second and possibly third liens pursuant to a collateral trust agreement.
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intangibles and other miscellaneous assets. The more frequent con-
vention, however, is for the First Lien Lender to obtain a senior secur-
ity interest in substantially all of the assets of the borrower and for the
Second Lien Lender to obtain a junior security interest in the same
assets as security for the Second Lien Loan.
The discussion that follows assumes the more frequent scenario in
which the Second Lien Loan is separately documented, the Second
Lien Lender holds a junior security interest behind the First Lien
Lender in all or substantially all of the assets of the borrower, the
Second Lien Loan is a term loan, and the First Lien Lender is the
provider to the borrower of an asset-based revolving credit facility (in-
cluding a letter of credit subfacility), a term loan and various bank
products, either as sole lender or in a syndicated loan arrangement.
This article is not intended to discuss each of the negotiation points
in the intercreditor agreement or attempt to characterize what is the
"market" position on the negotiation points that are discussed. As
most players in the Second Lien Loan market and their counsel can
attest, the market is quite fluid and therefore the perspective of the
Second Lien Lender and the outcome of intercreditor negotiations
will be driven significantly by (i) the identity of the Second Lien Loan
Lender (whether a hedge fund, investment bank, private equity fund
or affiliate of the First Lien Lender), (ii) the existence of prior trans-
actions that the Second Lien Lender may have concluded with the
First Lien Lender, (iii) the relative size of the Second Lien Loan to the
aggregate exposure of the First Lien Lender, (iv) the nature of the
First Lien Lender's loans (cash flow or hard asset-based), the intended
use of proceeds of the Second Lien Loan (e.g., to pay down debt owed
to the First Lien Lender, to effect a dividend to shareholders or to
provide additional working capital), and (v) the sophistication and ex-
perience of the attorneys and loan officers in dealing with the inter-
creditor issues in these types of transactions. The focus of this article
will be to highlight issues and the consequences of taking various posi-
tions on some of the key negotiation points.
II. SUBORDINATION OF LIENS
A. Overview
The provisions of the intercreditor agreement that address the sub-
ordination of the liens of the Second Lien Lender to those in favor of
the First Lien Lender are, for the most part, not the subject of lengthy
[Vol. 4:189
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debate. 9 The Second Lien Lender will customarily request an exemp-
tion from the lien subordination with respect to collateral that is sub-
ject to an unperfected, avoided or invalid lien or a lien that the First
Lien Lender has subordinated in favor of a third party.
B. Negotiating Points
1. Validity of First Lien Lender's Liens
* The Second Lien Lender can be expected to argue that the sub-
ordination of its liens to the liens of the First Lien Lender with respect
to any collateral is conditioned upon the validity, perfection and non-
avoidance (in an insolvency proceeding or otherwise) of the liens of
the First Lien Lender with respect to such collateral. The concern of
the Second Lien Lender in this regard is that the avoidance of an un-
perfected (but contractually senior) lien of the First Lien Lender in an
insolvency proceeding of the borrower may result in the preservation
of the avoided lien for the benefit of the estate under § 551 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 10 By preserving the avoided lien for the benefit of
the estate, a bankruptcy trustee will assert a right to the proceeds from
the disposition of the collateral that had been subject to the avoided
lien, at least to the extent of the amount of the claim secured by the
avoided lien, and will distribute those proceeds to the holders of un-
secured claims in the bankruptcy case. By conditioning the effective-
ness of this subordination upon the perfection of the senior secured
creditor's interest, the subordinating creditor hopes to avoid such an
attack by the bankruptcy trustee.11 In most cases, the inclusion of
such a conditional subordination in the intercreditor agreement is not
a "sticking point" for the First Lien Lender.
9. U.C.C. § 9-339 contemplates that one secured party may subordinate its security interest to
the security interest of another secured party in personal property collateral. U.C.C. § 9-339
(2005). Official Comment No. 2 to U.C.C. § 9-339 states that that section "makes it entirely
clear that a person entitled to priority may effectively agree to subordinate its claim." Id. § 9-339
cmt. 2. For a discussion of lien subordinations generally, see Richard J. Goldstein et al., Inter-
creditor Agreements, in HOWARD RUDA, ASSET-BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE,
Ch. 6 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005).
10. Section 551 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer avoided under certain provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code (including the avoidance of unperfected liens) is "preserved for
the benefit of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 551 (2005).
11. Indeed, a more aggressive trustee may take the position that, having avoided the contrac-
tually senior lien, all of the proceeds from a disposition of the collateral subject to the avoided
lien inure to the benefit of unsecured creditors, and the collateral proceeds available for un-
secured creditors are not limited to the amount of the claim secured by the avoided lien.
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2. No Contest of Liens
* The First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender rarely debate
the wisdom of including in the intercreditor agreement a provision to
the effect that neither will challenge the validity, perfection or priority
of the other's security interest in the collateral, except to the extent
necessary to enforce the subordination provisions of the intercreditor
agreement itself. Some intercreditor agreements go further by
prohibiting either party from encouraging or supporting the efforts of
the third parties to challenge the security interests of the other lender,
so as to discourage one lender from "tipping off" a bankruptcy trustee
or other creditor who might not otherwise detect infirmities known by
the tipping lender to exist with respect to the other lender's liens.
3. Further Subordination by First Lien Lender
* In the ordinary course of administering an asset-based loan rela-
tionship, the First Lien Lender may give lien subordinations to third
parties who deal with the borrower, such as suppliers, mortgagees,
warehousemen, common carriers, custom brokers, factors and deposi-
tory banks. Notwithstanding these subordinations, the First Lien
Lender expects that its liens with respect to the specific collateral as to
which such an "ordinary course subordination" is given should not
result in a forfeiture of its priority vis-d-vis the Second Lien Lender's
liens. Accordingly, the First Lien Lender will often seek clarification
in the document that the subordination of its liens in such circum-
stances does not result in a demotion of its liens to those of the Sec-
ond Lien Lender with respect to the specific collateral. 12
4. Liens Subject to Subordination
* The Second Lien Lender will seek to confine its subordination
to those liens held by it that are granted under the credit documenta-
tion evidencing the Second Lien Loan ("Second Lien Credit Docu-
ments"). Further, it will seek to restrict the liens to which it yields
priority to those liens of the First Lien Lender that arise under the
First Lien Lender's credit agreement and related documents ("First
12. Absent the agreement of the Second Lien Lender, a subordination by the First Lien
Lender of its security interest will not effect a subordination of the Second Lien Lender's lien to
any third party. See AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. J & D Fin. Corp., 679 So. 2d 695, 698 (Ala. 1996)
(subordination agreement between first and third secured creditors did not give third secured
creditor priority over second secured creditor); see ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. First City
Capital Corp., 737 S.W. 2d 803, 804 (Tex. 1987) (subordination by first secured creditor in favor
of third secured creditor gave third secured creditor priority over second secured creditor, but
only to the extent of first secured creditor's claim).
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Lien Credit Documents") and that secure the payment of the obliga-
tions arising under that agreement. In contrast, the First Lien Lender
will attempt to broaden the scope of the subordination so that all liens
at any time obtained by the Second Lien Lender are subordinated in
priority to all Lens of the First Lien Lender. If successful in negotiat-
ing this point, judgment liens of the Second Lien Lender (which might
otherwise take priority over the First Lien Lender's security interest
under the UCC after the passage of 45 days13) and liens obtained by
the Second Lien Lender in the borrower's bankruptcy proceeding (in-
cluding adequate protection and DIP financing liens 14) will be junior
to the liens of the First Lien Lender. Specifically, the First Lien
Lender will argue that any lien obtained by it, whether under the First
Lien Credit Documents, in bankruptcy or otherwise, should be supe-
rior to any lien at any time obtained by the Second Lien Lender. This
debate typically engenders significant discussions regarding DIP fi-
nancing issues, which are discussed below. One significant measure of
protection for the Second Lien Lender is the limitation on the amount
of the indebtedness owing to the First Lien Lender that enjoys the
benefit of the priority liens, a subject that is discussed below.
III. MAXIMUM FIRST LIEN LENDER DEBT
A. Overview
The Second Lien Lender can be expected to ask for a cap on the
total amount of indebtedness outstanding to the First Lien Lender
(the "First Lien Lender Debt") that will enjoy the benefit of a senior
lien. The First Lien Lender Debt that is secured by liens in favor of
the First Lien Lender may include advances outstanding under a re-
volving credit facility, reimbursement obligations associated with let-
ters of credit, term loans made by the First Lien Lender, bank
products15 , claims under indemnities given by the borrower, and inter-
13. Pursuant to revised U.C.C. § 9-323(b),,a security interest is subordinate to the rights of the
person that becomes a "lien creditor" to the extent that the security interest secures advances
made more than 45 days after the person becomes a lien creditor, unless the advance is made
without knowledge of the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of
the lien.
14. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
15. As used in this article and as conventionally used in credit agreements between a First
Lien Lender and a borrower, the term "bank products" embraces the full range of products
offered by the First Lien Lender (assuming it is a bank) to the borrower, including, without
limitation, depository accounts, automatic clearinghouse services, electronic funds transfer ser-
vices, commercial credit cards, merchant card services, hedging agreements, lock-box services
and other types of banking products or cash management services provided by the First Lien
Lender.
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est, fees (including legal fees) and other charges payable in connection
with the foregoing. However, the manner in which such a cap is nego-
tiated and documented can have significant consequences for the First
Lien Lender. Accordingly, careful drafting by the First Lien Lender is
essential to avoid the loss of senior lien status for part of the First Lien
Lender Debt that might inadvertently exceed the cap. 16
B. Negotiating Points
1. Absolute Dollar Cap
* Some Second Lien Lenders are content simply to establish an
absolute dollar cap on the total amount of debt that may be outstand-
ing in favor of the First Lien Lender and that is secured by a senior
lien. In that context, the amount of the cap is generally pegged at the
initial maximum credit facility under the First Lien Credit Documents
plus a negotiated "cushion" for expected growth in the credit facility.
2. Borrowing Base Cap
* More commonly, the Second Lien Lender will seek both an
overall senior debt limit and separate caps on each component of the
overall credit facility offered by the First Lien Lender. The amount of
First Lien Lender Debt within the cap is often referred to in an inter-
creditor agreement as "Priority Lender Debt" and the amount over
the cap is often called "Non-Priority Lender Debt." To that end, the
Second Lien Lender will ask for a ceiling on the principal amount of
the First Lien Lender Debt consisting of revolver debt (which includes
revolver loans and letters of credit) at an amount equal to the lesser
on any date of a maximum dollar amount (the "Revolver Line Cap")
or the borrowing base on such date (the "Borrowing Base Cap"), de-
16. There is an important distinction between a negotiated cap on First Lien Lender Debt
which, if exceeded, would mean that the First Lien Lender has breached a covenant in the inter-
creditor agreement, and a cap on the amount of First Lien Lender Debt that will enjoy the
benefit of the senior lien. In the first instance, the consequence of exceeding the cap includes the
recovery of any damages sustained by the Second Lien Lender as a result of the First Lien
Lender's breach. In the second scenario, the First Lien Lender's liens are demoted in favor of
the Second Lien Lender to the extent of the excess. One might question why the First Lien
Lender would ever intentionally allow the First Lien Lender Debt to exceed the cap if the result
was a reversal of lien priorities for the excess of the First Lien Lender Debt. If the value of the
collateral is inadequate to cover the full amount of the First Lien Lender Debt, and the prospects
of recovering a deficiency from the borrower are remote, the First Lien Lender may be willing to
fund "overadvances" to the extent necessary to allow for an orderly liquidation or a going con-
cern sale, in the hopes of reducing the size of its deficiency claim. Of course, in such circum-
stances, making loans in breach of a covenant in the intercreditor agreement capping the
aggregate First Lien Lender Debt might very well be found not to have caused any damage to
the interests of the Second Lien Lender.
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termined pursuant to the First Lien Credit Documents as in effect on
the date of the intercreditor agreement.17
0 From the First Lien Lender's perspective, it is important that
only the unpaid principal balance of the revolver portion of the First
Lien Lender Debt be subjected to the Revolver Line Cap. Otherwise,
when the revolver is fully funded up to the Revolver Line Cap, the
aggregate revolver indebtedness may exceed the Revolver Line Cap
by virtue of accruals, such as interest, fees and other charges. 18 With
regard to the dollar cap on the revolver facility, the First Lien Lender
should insure that the cap is sufficiently high to allow room for future
growth in the revolver facility. With respect to the borrowing base
cap, a frequent compromise is to allow for "overadvances" 19 (whether
advertently or inadvertently made by the First Lien Lender) in an
amount not to exceed the greater of a specific dollar amount or a per-
centage (say, 10%) of the borrowing base in effect from time to time.
To avoid situations where the revolver debt outstanding inadvertently
exceeds the cap solely by virtue of receivable agings or other changes
in collateral eligibility (a so-called "backed-in overadvance"), the First
Lien Lender should make clear in the intercreditor agreement that, in
calculating the maximum revolver debt that may be funded on any
date, the First Lien Lender may rely upon the borrowing base calcula-
tion shown in the last borrowing base certificate received from the
borrower, without regard to any subsequent changes in the quality,
quantity or mix of the reported collateral or any errors of the bor-
rower in such reporting.
17. In most asset-based financings, the lender agrees to make revolver loans up to the lesser,
in any date, of a line of credit amount or the amount of a so-called "borrowing base" at such
date. The borrowing base is typically calculated as a percentage rate of advance (say, 80%)
against eligible accounts and a separate rate of advance (say, 50%) against eligible inventory of
the borrower. The borrowing base automatically adjusts as the composition of the borrower's
eligible accounts and eligible inventory increases or decreases from time to time. The amount of
a borrower's availability for borrowings under an asset-based financing arrangement on any date
will be equal to the borrowing base on that date less the amount of loans and letters of credit
outstanding on that date.
18. Consideration should be given to excluding from the Revolver Line Cap any increase in
the outstanding principal amount of revolving credit loans that result from so-called "refunding
loans," which are advances automatically made under the revolving credit facility to pay First
Lien Lender Debt that is then due and payable, such as interest, fees and other charges. Since
such refunding loans are used to pay First Lien Lender Debt that would otherwise constitute
Priority Lender Debt, the Second Lien Lender ordinarily will have no objection to the inclusion
of such provision.
19. An "overadvance" exists in an asset-based lending facility when outstanding revolver
loans on any date (together with any outstanding letters of credit) exceed the borrowing base on
such date.
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3. First Lien Lender's Term Loans
* In order to capture any perceived "equity" in the collateral, the
Second Lien Lender will press for provisions in the intercreditor
agreement limiting or prohibiting the funding of additional term loans
by the First Lien Lender, disallowing any "reloading" of term loans
funded at closing, and requiring that the proceeds of any non-ordinary
course dispositions of fixed-asset collateral be used to reduce, perma-
nently, either the outstanding term loans of the First Lien Lender or
the Revolver Line Cap. While a requirement of permanent reduction
of the term loans generally is not problematic for the First Lien
Lender, care must be taken in drafting provisions that address perma-
nent reductions in the Revolver Line Cap. Such reductions may have
the unexpected consequence of depriving the borrower of needed li-
quidity and causing an overadvance to exist. Typically, the Revolver
Line Cap should not be reduced (nor any borrowing availability re-
serve increased) by the application of proceeds of fixed asset disposi-
tions to the revolver loans prior to default and the First Lien Lender's
commencement of lien enforcement action. In addition, the First Lien
Lender will wish to avoid any undertaking in the intercreditor agree-
ment to reduce the term loans from proceeds of non-ordinary course
dispositions of collateral if, in the First Lien Credit Documents, the
borrower is authorized to use a portion of such of proceeds (such as
insurance proceeds or condemnation awards) to rebuild or replace
damaged or condemned collateral.
4. Bank Products Limitations
* A First Lien Lender that provides bank products20 may insist
upon including such bank products as a component of the Priority
Lender Debt. The Second Lien Lender will counter with a require-
ment for some dollar cap on the amount of bank product obligations
that will enjoy the benefit of the first lien and, therefore, constitute
Priority Lender Debt.21 If the First Lien Credit Documents impose a
reserve against borrowing availability in an amount equal to bank
20. See supra note 15.
21. If the First Lien Lender is the administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders and if the
negotiated cap on Priority Lender Debt is exceeded, the question will arise as to how the result-
ing Non-Priority Lender Debt is to be allocated among the syndicate members. A pro rata
allocation would appear to be the logical result, but such a result may not be warranted where
the syndicate members do not participate on a pro rata basis in all of the credit facilities pro-
vided for under the First Lien Credit Documents. If the excess First Lien Lender Debt above
the Priority Lender Debt amount results from banking relationship debt and such banking rela-
tionship debt is, pursuant to the terms of the First Lien Credit Documents, to be paid after all
other obligations owed to the syndicate members, then the holder of such banking relationship
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product obligations outstanding from time to time, the dollar cap on
the amount of bank product obligations might be set at the amount of
the reserve. Normally, the First Lien Lender will exclude from the
definition of "bank products" any letters of credit that are issued
under to the revolving credit facility. Otherwise, there may be an un-
intended limitation on the aggregate amount of letters of credit that
may be outstanding, which is in addition to the limitations on the
amount of revolving facility indebtedness that qualifies as Priority
Lender Debt.
5. Add-Ons to Priority Lender Debt
* After negotiating the various dollar caps for components of the
First Lien Lender Debt, the First Lien Lender will likely insist upon
certain add-ons to the Priority Lender Debt. Those add-ons will likely
include interest accruals, enforcement expenses (broadly defined to
include all expenses associated with realizing upon the collateral or
collecting the First Lien Lender Debt after default), fees provided for
under the First Lien Credit Documents, and amounts owing at any
time under indemnity agreements from the borrower under any of the
First Lien Credit Documents. Those add-ons, which are not usually
subject to a dollar limitation, are of critical importance to the First
Lien Lender because their incurrence or accrual might otherwise
cause the aggregate amount of the First Lien Lender Debt to exceed
the cap.
The Second Lien Lender may want assurances that any accruals,
enforcement expenses or indemnity amounts that relate exclusively to
any Non-Priority Lender Debt will be excluded from treatment as Pri-
ority Lender Debt. Moreover, the Second Lien Lender may insist that
only interest at the non-default rate will constitute Priority Lender
Debt, with the differential between the non-default interest rate of
interest and the default rate of interest constituting Non-Priority
Lender Debt. The Second Lien Lender will frequently take the posi-
tion that any termination charges or prepayment premiums (other
than LIBOR breakage costs) payable to the First Lien Lender must
be included in the basket of Non-Priority Lender Debt.
6. The "Waterfall" and Payment of Non-Priority Lender Debt
* Even if the amount owing to the First Lien Lender exceeds a
negotiated cap, the First Lien Lender should insist that such Non-Pri-
debt presumably would bear the brunt of characterization of its claim for banking relationship
debt as Non-Priority Lender Debt.
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ority Lender Debt nevertheless remains secured by the collateral. The
"waterfall" section of the intercreditor agreement, which allocates
proceeds of collateral between the First Lien Lender and the Second
Lien Lender, will usually provide for the payment of the Non-Priority
Lender Debt after the payment of all principal and interest with re-
spect to the Second Lien Loan, but before the payment of any early
termination charges or other prepayment premiums to the Second
Lien Lender. Issue may be joined on the question whether the termi-
nation charges or prepayment premiums payable to the First Lien
Lender should be paid prior to, or after, payment in full of all termina-
tion charges or other prepayment premiums owing to the Second Lien
Lender.
7. DIP Financing
The First Lien Lender should include in the definition of Priority
Lender Debt any financing provided to the borrower in a Chapter 11
case (called "DIP financing"), provided that the aggregate of the pre-
petition financing and the DIP financing does not exceed the negoti-
ated dollar cap. The failure to do so may complicate the First Lien
Lender's efforts, in a DIP financing context, to "roll up" the pre-peti-
tion indebtedness owed to it into a DIP financing arrangement.22
IV. STANDBY AS TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A. Overview
Intercreditor agreements in second lien financing transactions rou-
tinely require the Second Lien Lender to refrain from taking certain
enforcement actions, notwithstanding defaults under the Second Lien
Credit Documents, unless the default is a so-called "actionable event
of default" or the claims of the First Lien Lender have been fully
paid.23 Actionable events of default normally include the institution
22. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
23. Official Comment No. 5 to U.C.C. § 9-610 is instructive and states: "Disposition rights
under subsection (a) are not limited to first-priority security interests. Rather, any secured party
as to whom there has been a default enjoys the right to dispose of collateral under this subsec-
tion. The exercise of this right by a secured party whose security interest is subordinate to that
of another secured party does not of itself constitute a conversion or otherwise give rise to liabil-
ity in favor of the holder of the senior security interest." U.C.C. 9-610 cmt. 5 (2005). For a
discussion of the right of a secured party to foreclose upon collateral notwithstanding the exis-
tence of a prior security interest, see C. Edward Dobbs, Enforcement of Article 9 Security Inter-
ests - Why So Much Deference to the Junior Secured Party?, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 131 (1994).
Although waivers of rights by debtors and other obligors are restricted by U.C.C. § 9-602
(2005), there is no express prohibition in Revised Article 9 of the U.C.C. that would render
unenforceable a junior secured party's agreement to waive or defer the exercise of certain lien
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of a lien enforcement action by the First Lien Lender and the occur-
rence of payment and certain other critical defaults under the Second
Lien Credit Documents. Notwithstanding the occurrence of an ac-
tionable event of default, the Second Lien Lender is required to for-
bear for a mutually agreed upon number of consecutive days (the
"standby period") 24. The standby period affords a "breathing spell"
to allow the borrower and First Lien Lender either to cure the de-
faults or to prepare for alternative courses of action, including
bankruptcy.
B. Negotiating Points
1. "Full Payment" of First Lien Lender Debt
* Absent an actionable event of default, the Second Lien Lender
is usually prohibited by the intercreditor agreement from initiating en-
forcement action prior to payment in full of all First Lien Lender Debt
(up to the Priority Lender Debt amount). Thus, both the First Lien
Lender and the Second Lien Lender will be interested in defining the
circumstances under which full payment will be deemed to have oc-
curred. The First Lien Lender will wish to make clear in the inter-
creditor agreement that its claim has not been "fully paid" until all
loans and other non-contingent obligations have been paid in full, all
contingent obligations (such as outstanding letters of credit) have
been cash collateralized, and all commitments to extend credit have
been terminated. The Second Lien Lender should be alert to the
presence of language in the intercreditor agreement that might be
construed to delay its enforcement remedies until the cash collateral-
ization or resolution of claims that might give rise to an indemnity
from the borrower and that have yet to be asserted, such as unasserted
potential claims of liability against the First Lien Lender. Such lan-
guage may have the effect of forcing the Second Lien Lender to for-
bear from taking lien enforcement action until the expiration of
enforcement remedies pursuant to an intercreditor agreement. See Robert B. Stein, Enforcement
of the Silent Second Lien, 27 U.C.C. L.J. 165 (1994).
24. The First Lien Lender will resist efforts by the Second Lien Lender to include any event of
default under the First Lien Credit Documents as an actionable event of default, as otherwise
the occurrence of any such default would trigger the standby period even if the First Lien Lender
elected to waive the default. Nevertheless, the Second Lien Lender may have a legitimate con-
cern that, if the event of default under the First Lien Credit Documents is not waived within
some specified period of time and is otherwise known to exist by the First Lien Lender, the First
Lien Lender, in collaboration with the borrower, may orchestrate a forbearance arrangement
and orderly winddown of the borrower's business in a manner that is not strictly a lien enforce-
ment action by the First Lien Lender and that is inimicable to the interests of the Second Lien
Lender.
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applicable limitations periods for the assertion of potential claims
against the First Lien Lender, even though the First Lien Lender's
loans and letters of credit have been fully paid or cash collateralized.
2. Scope of Remedy Block
* A significant issue to be negotiated will be the scope of the
block on remedies that may be exercised during the standby period.
The Second Lien Lender may argue that any remedy block be con-
fined to actions that it would otherwise be authorized to take to en-
force its junior liens in the collateral. Such blocked remedies would
include repossessions, foreclosures, attachments, garnishments, set-
offs, lawsuits, commencement of involuntary bankruptcy cases, and
the exercise of voting rights with respect to pledged equity securities.
The First Lien Lender may push for a more expansive remedy block,
to include a bar against acceleration of the maturity of the Second
Lien Loan, primarily because of the adverse impact that such an accel-
eration might have on leases, licenses and other material agreements
of the borrower and the potential effect upon trade creditors.
* The Second Lien Lender will ask that the remedy bar in the
intercreditor agreement not operate to prohibit it from (i) filing
proofs of claim in any insolvency proceeding, (ii) taking action to per-
fect its liens on the collateral; (iii) filing necessary responsive or defen-
sive pleadings in opposition to proceedings instituted by others
(including the borrower) to disallow the claims of the Second Lien
Lender; (iv) voting on any plan of reorganization in a Chapter 11 case
of the borrower; (v) joining in any judicial foreclosure or other judicial
lien enforcement proceeding initiated by the First Lien Lender to the
extent that such joinder is in a manner that is not adverse to the inter-
ests of the First Lien Lender, does not materially delay the First Lien
Lender's exercise of its remedies and is necessary to preserve the
rights or remedies of the Second Lien Lender; (vi) bidding at any pub-
lic sale of the collateral; or (vii) receiving surplus proceeds from the
First Lien Lender's sale or other disposition of collateral after pay-
ment in full of the Priority Lender Debt. Although the Second Lien
Lender may also wish to reserve the right to file (or join in the filing
by others of) an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the borrower,
the invocation of such a remedy is rare and its exercise by the holder
of a claim that is the subject of a bona fide dispute could prove risky.25
25. Under recent amendments to Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a petitioning credi-
tor may be disqualified if all or part of its claim is subject to a bona fide dispute. If an involun-
tary bankruptcy petition is ultimately dismissed, the petitioning creditors may be subject to a
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3. Actionable Events of Default
* The First Lien Lender will be keenly interested in the defaults
under the Second Lien Credit Documents that constitute "actionable
events of default" and that may trigger the commencement of the
standby period. The Second Lien Lender may initially insist that all
events of default under the Second Lien Credit Documents constitute
actionable events of default. The First Lien Lender will seek to limit
those defaults to certain key ones, such as bankruptcy, the First Lien
Lender's commencement of lien enforcement action26 and the expira-
tion of the standby period following payment and other material de-
faults. In all events, the First Lien Lender will endeavor to exclude
from the list of actionable events of default cross-defaults to the First
Lien Credit Documents or at least to exclude cross-defaults based
upon financial covenants in the First Lien Credit Documents that are
more stringent than similar covenants contained in the Second Lien
Credit Documents.
4. Standby Period
* A significant issue for both parties will be the duration of the
standby period. A 60-day standby period would generally be regarded
as shorter than normal and a period of 180 days or longer would ex-
ceed what is encountered in most intercreditor agreements. The
standby period, whatever its duration, should not commence until re-
ceipt by the First Lien Lender of written notice from the Second Lien
Lender that an actionable event of default has occurred under the
Second Lien Credit Documents and that the Second Lien Lender in-
tends that the standby period commence. Otherwise, the First Lien
Lender may be surprised to learn that the standby period has run and
the Second Lien Lender is no longer barred from commencing en-
forcement action with respect to the Collateral. Moreover, the Sec-
ond Lien Lender will wish to make clear that the standby period ends
claim for damages and, if the petition is found to have been filed in bad faith, actual and punitive
damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2005),
26. If the standby period terminates upon an actionable event of default consisting of the First
Lien Lender's commencement of a lien enforcement action, then the question is rightly asked
whether the Second Lien Lender will be at liberty to conduct a simultaneous foreclosure on the
same collateral in respect of which the First Lien Lender has commenced foreclosure. As noted
later in the text, the First Lien Lender will argue that, notwithstanding the termination of the
standby period, the Second Lien Lender is not authorized to initiate lien enforcement action at
any time that the First Lien Lender is diligently pursuing such action with respect to all or any
part of the collateral. The termination of the standby period should, nevertheless, permit the
Second Lien Lender to join in any judicial enforcement action to the extent necessary to protect
its interests (such as a mortgage foreclosure action) provided that in doing so it does not unduly
hinder or impede the foreclosure action of the First Lien Lender.
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on the date that the Priority Lender Debt is paid in full, if such full
payment occurs sooner than the expiration of the number of days in
the standby period. The Second Lien Lender often will seek to limit
the number of standby periods that may be imposed during any period
of 365 days (say, two) and to require that a minimum number of con-
secutive days (say, 120) elapse between the end of one standby period
and the imposition of another.
0 The intercreditor agreement normally provides that, during the
standby period, only the First Lien Lender may initiate an enforce-
ment action with respect to the collateral. At the conclusion of the
standby period, the Second Lien Lender should nevertheless be pre-
cluded from commencing any lien enforcement action if, at the time of
proposed enforcement, the First Lien Lender has commenced and is
"diligently pursuing" such enforcement action with respect to a mate-
rial part of the collateral27 or if the First Lien Lender is barred (by
insolvency proceeding stays, specific court restraining orders or other-
wise) from commencing an enforcement action.28
5. Turnover of Collateral Proceeds
* The Second Lien Lender should not find objectionable a provi-
sion in the intercreditor agreement requiring it to turn over any pro-
ceeds of collateral that it may receive, prior to payment in full of the
First Lien Lender Debt (at least to the extent of the Priority Lender
Debt amount), during any period that the First Lien Lender is enforc-
ing its liens. Even if the Second Lien Lender is authorized to com-
mence an enforcement action upon termination of a standby period,
the intercreditor agreement will often require that any proceeds re-
ceived from any such action by the Second Lien Lender (exclusive of
its reasonable enforcement expenses) must be turned over immedi-
27. The Second Lien Lender may argue that it should not be precluded from commencing any
lien enforcement actions unless the First Lender is foreclosing upon all of the collateral. It is
unlikely, however, that the First Lien Lender will simultaneously foreclose on all of the collat-
eral, particularly in situations where the collateral consists of fixed assets, such as real estate and
equipment. In practice, the more readily liquidatable collateral (such as accounts and inventory)
is foreclosed upon or collected first and the more difficult collateral to dispose of, such as real
estate, is the last item of collateral from which the First Lien Lender would seek to recover its
loans.
28. Upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case (whether voluntarily by or involuntarily
against a debtor), Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes an "automatic stay" against
certain creditor action against the debtor or its assets, including any lien enforcement action,
without the bankruptcy court's approval. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005). Because the duration of the
stay or a specific restraining order may be indeterminate, the Second Lien Lender may negotiate
a period of time by which, if the stay or restraining order is not lifted, the Second Lien Lender
(to the extent that it is not itself stayed or enjoined) would nevertheless be authorized to pro-
ceed with its own lien enforcement action.
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ately to the First Lien Lender for application to the First Lien Lender
Debt (exclusive of Non-Priority Lender Debt). On occasion, the First
Lien Lender may encounter some debate from a Second Lien Lender
that believes it should be entitled to retain all proceeds received from
its enforcement action, without any obligation to turn over the net
proceeds to the First Lien Lender to the extent of the Priority Lender
Debt.2 9 Otherwise, the Second Lien Lender will argue, its authority
to enforce its lien at the end of a standby period does not afford it any
meaningful remedy. The common rejoinder by the First Lien Lender
is that such an outcome would be inconsistent with the lien priorities
established by the parties and that the purpose of allowing the Second
Lien Lender to initiate an enforcement action when the First Lien
Lender is inactive is to enable the Second Lien Lender to force some
action to be taken, either by the First Lien Lender or by the bor-
rower's commencement of a bankruptcy case.30
* The First Lien Lender may bargain for a provision to the effect
that the Second Lien Lender will not interfere or object to any fore-
closure proceeding initiated by the First Lien Lender. The Second
Lien Lender's response may be that it will refrain from doing so as
long as the First Lien Lender is proceeding in a commercially reasona-
ble manner and otherwise in accordance with applicable law.31
29. The rationale generally offered by the Second Lien Lender for this position is that it is
authorized under the U.C.C. to retain the proceeds from a foreclosure sale, without any obliga-
tion to turn the same over to the First Lien Lender. See U.C.C. § 9-607(a) (2005); id. § 9-607 cmt.
5. Such a result is particularly warranted if the Second Lien Lender undertakes the effort and
expense of foreclosure when the First Lien Lender elects not to proceed with a disposition of the
collateral after default.
30. The First Lien Lender might also point to Official Comment No. 5 to U.C.C. § 9-610,
which states in part that the "holder of a senior security interest is entitled, by virtue of its
priority, to take possession of collateral from the junior secured party and conduct its own dispo-
sition, provided that the senior enjoys the right to take possession of the collateral from the
debtor." See also U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 5 (2005). Conflicting rights to possession among secured
parties are resolved by the priority rules of this Article. Thus, a senior secured party is entitled
to possession as against a junior claimant. Normally, a junior who refuses to relinquish posses-
sion of collateral upon the demand of a secured party having a superior possessory right to the
collateral would be liable in conversion.
31. In addition, the Second Lien Lender may seek to include a covenant in the intercreditor
agreement compelling the First Lien Lender to conduct any foreclosure sale in a commercially
reasonable manner. Because the U.C.C. already imposes a non-waivable obligation on the part
of the secured party to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner, the addition of a covenant
to that effect in the intercreditor agreement would be superfluous. See U.C.C. § 9-602(7); id. § 9-
610(b) (2005). Moreover, the inclusion of such a superfluous covenant might be misconstrued by
a court as imposing an even higher duty of commercial reasonableness on the First Lien Lender
than is required under the U.C.C.
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6. Second Lien Lender's Cure Rights
* Occasionally, the Second Lien Lender may request cure rights
with respect to defaults that may occur under the First Lien Credit
Documents. While the First Lien Lender may be predisposed to agree
to such cure rights, a word of caution is in order. First, the inter-
creditor agreement should delineate those defaults that the Second
Lien Lender may cure, which should include only defaults which by
their nature are curable, such as payment defaults. In addition, the
First Lien Lender should make clear that, by conferring upon the Sec-
ond Lien Lender a right to cure, the First Lien Lender is not obliged
to forbear from exercising rights and remedies under the First Lien
Credit Documents pending such a cure. Otherwise, the First Lien
Lender may find itself in the position of having to forbear pending a
cure that may or may not be forthcoming from the Second Lien
Lender and at a time when immediate action by the First Lien Lender
is necessary to safeguard the collateral.
7. Keeping Perspective on Issues
* In practice, the parties may expend considerable time and ener-
gies in negotiating the standby provisions of the intercreditor agree-
ment. In doing so, they may overlook the fact that, especially in
sizeable credit facilities to substantial companies, the likelihood of lien
enforcement action by either party is remote. Rather than suffer a
lien foreclosure, most borrowers will seek relief under the Bankruptcy
Code. Furthermore, the Second Lien Lender should be mindful of the
fact that its ability to dispose of tangible items of collateral (such as
inventory, equipment or real estate) is considerably hampered by the
existence of a prior lien in favor of the First Lender as purchasers of
the collateral from the Second Lien Lender will take subject to the
lien of the First Lien Lender.32 Hence, the parties would have little to
gain from, and should not expend undue effort in negotiating, posi-
tions on lien enforcement action issues that are extreme or clearly be-
yond the norm.
32. A secured party's disposition of collateral after default transfers to a purchaser for value
all of the debtor's rights in the collateral and discharges the security interest of the foreclosing
secured party, and subordinate security interest, but does not cut off security interests senior in
priority to the security interest of the foreclosing secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a) (2005).
With respect to accounts receivable collateral, a foreclosure remedy by the Second Lien Lender
is generally exercised by collection of the accounts, rather than by a foreclosure sale of them. As
a result of the collection effort, the First Lien Lender's security interest is dissipated by the
amount of the collections and, if the Second Lien Lender is authorized to retain the collections,
the dissipation is permanent and irrevocable.
[Vol. 4:189
NEGOTIATING POINTS
V. RELEASE OF LIENS
A. Overview
Parties to an intercreditor agreement often include provisions ad-
dressing the circumstances under which the Second Lien Lender is
obligated to release its liens with respect to specific collateral sold by
the borrower with the First Lien Lender's consent. As a general rule,
the First Lien Lender will take steps to insure that the Second Lien
Credit Documents contain the same provisions with respect to the
borrower's authority to dispose of collateral free of liens as are con-
tained in the First Lien Credit Documents.33 The First Lien Lender's
failure to do so may empower the Second Lien Lender to block the
implementation of the bargain between the borrower and the First
Lien Lender on the subject of permitted asset sales. There are, how-
ever, other instances in which the First Lien Lender may consent to
dispositions of collateral that are not permitted by its credit documen-
tation and desire that the Second Lien Lender release its liens in order
to facilitate the disposition.
B. Negotiating Points
1. Pre-Default Releases
* Most Second Lien Lenders will be disinclined to commit them-
selves to lien releases except as agreed to with the borrower in the
Second Lien Credit Documents. After all, through the process of ne-
gotiation, the Second Lien Lender and the borrower have established
in the Second Lien Credit Documents the ground rules upon which,
prior to default, the borrower will be permitted to make dispositions
of assets constituting collateral. If those ground rules are substantially
the same as those contained in the First Lien Credit Documents (and
the First Lien Lender can be expected to insist that they be), then it
may fall on deaf ears for the First Lien Lender to argue that the
ground rules should be loosened still further in the intercreditor
agreement.
2. Post-Default Releases
* After default, and in connection with a debt restructuring or
forbearance agreement, it may be necessary and prudent for the bor-
rower to make certain asset dispositions outside of the ordinary
33. U.C.C. § 9-315(a) provides that a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding
any sale or other disposition of the collateral, unless the secured party authorized the disposition
free of its security interest. U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (2005).
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course of business for a variety of purposes, including to generate
needed liquidity or to divest itself of unprofitable operations. Because
post-default dispositions of assets outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness are typically not permitted by either the First Lien Credit Docu-
ments or the Second Lien Credit Documents, the Second Lien
Lender's refusal to give its consent to such a disposition consented to
by the First Lien Lender may frustrate the borrower's debt restructur-
ing plan. Faced with such a refusal, the borrower may have no option
other than to seek bankruptcy relief. Recognizing the potential for
stalemate, the First Lien Lender may seek to induce the Second Lien
Lender's consent to dispositions that are conditioned upon a range of
pre-determined dollar baskets, the application of disposition proceeds
as a permanent reduction of the Priority Lender Debt, release prices
that are pegged to the fair value of the assets in question and the trig-
gering of an option in favor of the Second Lien Lender to purchase
the First Lien Lender Debt (exclusive of Non-Priority Lender Debt),
in the manner discussed in greater detail below. 34
, The Second Lien Lender should make clear, either in the Sec-
ond Lien Credit Documents or in the intercreditor agreement, that
any permitted asset disposition must be for a purchase price payable
in cash or such other consideration as is acceptable to the Second Lien
Lender. Non-cash consideration, to the extent it remains uncollected,
will not reduce the amount of the indebtedness owed to the First Lien
Lender and could, therefore, dilute the Second Lien Lender's position
in the collateral.
3. Proceeds Application
* With respect to the application of asset disposition proceeds, the
Second Lien Lender will usually require that fixed asset proceeds be
applied first in reduction of any outstanding term loans of the First
Lien Lender and, after payment in full of such loans, to the revolver
obligations. Because application to the revolver obligations may cre-
ate additional borrowing availability that can be reborrowed under
the revolving credit facility, the Second Lien Lender will seek to pre-
vent fixed asset disposition proceeds from being used simply to gener-
ate working capital. To the extent that fixed asset proceeds are
applied to the revolving obligations, the Second Lien Lender will urge
that the payments result in a permanent reduction of the Revolver
Line Cap.35 With these types of restrictions, the Second Lien Lender
34. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
35. While a permanent reduction in the Revolver Line Cap may be helpful, the Second Lien
Lender might also argue that the borrowing availability under the Revolver Line Cap be blocked
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may be comforted that asset dispositions after default will not result in
a dissipation of any equity in the collateral to which its lien has at-
tached and, if all else fails, it has the option to purchase the Priority
Lender Debt and thereafter control the collateral.
4. Power of Attorney to Release Liens
* As a measure of protection against a recalcitrant Second Lien
Lender who refuses to file appropriate lien releases in connection with
asset dispositions to which it has given its advance consent, the First
Lien Lender should include in the intercreditor agreement an irrevo-
cable power of attorney to file such releases if the Second Lien
Lender fails or refuses to do so within a prescribed time period.
5. Permanent Paydown of First Lien Lender Debt
* The outcome of negotiations over the Second Lien Lender's re-
lease of liens are varied and depend upon the nature of the borrower,
the nature of the collateral, the forecasted likelihood of the borrower
making asset dispositions, and the relative amount of the claims of the
First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender. Equally as important, the
negotiations may well turn on the First Lien Lender's willingness to
accept net disposition proceeds as a permanent paydown of the First
Lien Lender Debt. To the extent that it agrees to such a permanent
paydown, the First Lien Lender must insure that the First Lien Credit
Documents expressly authorize it, vis-d-vis the borrower, to effectuate
such a permanent paydown, including any reductions in the Revolver
Line Cap and the imposition of any borrowing availability reserves.
VI. AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN BANKRUPTCY MATTERS
A. Overview
The intercreditor agreement provisions that deal with bankruptcy
matters are usually the most vigorously negotiated portion of the
agreement. By virtue of having a lien upon property of a debtor in
bankruptcy, a secured creditor (including the holder of a junior lien) is
afforded many rights and privileges. Those rights and privileges give
it considerable leverage in a bankruptcy case and include the right to
(i) receive "adequate protection" of its interest in the debtor's prop-
by an amount equal to the fixed asset disposition proceeds applied to the revolver loan obliga-
tions instead of the term loan. This will better ensure that the amount of fixed asset disposition
proceeds applied to the revolver loans are not simply reborrowed up to the Revolving Line Cap.
The First Lien Lender will, as a result, be motivated to apply all fixed asset disposition proceeds
first in payment of any outstanding term loans and other obligations before application of such
proceeds is made to the revolving loan obligations.
2006]
210 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:189
erty as a condition to any use, sale or other disposition of such prop-
erty, including the debtor's use of cash collateral or the granting of
any priming liens to secure DIP financing;36 (ii) to seek relief from the
automatic stay in order to foreclose if such adequate protection is not
provided; (iii) to accrue (and, in many jurisdictions, to receive current
payment of) interest, fees and other charges provided for under the
pre-petition documentation to the extent that the secured creditor's
claim is "fully secured" (i.e., the value of the collateral exceeds the
secured creditor's claim);37 (iv) to object to any sale of collateral pur-
suant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code unless the net sale proceeds
will satisfy the creditor's claim or such a sale could be effectuated
under other applicable law despite the creditor's opposition;38 and
36. There is no definition of "adequate protection" in the Bankruptcy Code, but Section 361
provides a nonexclusive list of forms that adequate protection may take. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2005).
The purpose of adequate protection is to provide secured creditors with sufficient protection
against diminution and the value of the secured creditor's interest in the debtor's assets, failing
which protection, the debtor's use or the disposition of the collateral would constitute a "taking"
in violation of fifth amendment rights.
A common form of adequate protection of the holders of liens upon a debtor's current assets
(such as accounts receivable and inventory) is to grant the secured creditor a "replacement lien"
in the same type of property acquired by the debtor in its bankruptcy case after the commence-
ment of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (2005) (which contemplates the provision of an "addi-
tional or replacement lien" to a secured creditor as a means of adequate protection). Absent the
provision of such a "replacement lien," the value of the secured creditor's interest in such cur-
rent asset collateral may diminish significantly during the pendency of the bankruptcy case by
virtue of the debtor's use, sale or other disposition of such assets. By virtue of Section 552 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a security interest in pre-petition assets of the debtor (such as accounts and
inventory) does not extend to the same types or items of property acquired by the debtor after
the commencement of the bankruptcy case, except to the extent that any such assets acquired by
the debtor after bankruptcy constitute proceeds or products of pre-petition collateral and the
security interest created by the debtor extends to such proceeds or products. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(2005); id. § 552(b).
If the adequate protection granted to the Second Lien Lender proves to be inadequate, the
Second Lien Lender (like any other secured creditor) is allowed a claim under Section 507(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code that is entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(2). Prior to exiting a
Chapter 11 case, the debtor is obligated by Section 1129(a)(9)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to pay
all such priority claims in cash, including those of inadequately protected secured creditors under
Section 507(b). That cash out obligation may significantly increase the cash requirements neces-
sary for the debtor's confirmed reorganization plan to be implemented. It should be noted that
the priority claims under Section 507(a)(2) will be entitled to payment prior to any general un-
secured deficiency claim of the First Lien Lender.
37. Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the holder of an allowed claim that is
secured by property having a value in excess of the amount of the claim may seek recovery of
interest accrued on the claim during the bankruptcy case and any reasonable fees, costs or
charges provided for under the agreement (or any state statute) under which the claim arose. 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) (2005).
38. Pursuant to Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may sell property of the
estate, without the necessity of obtaining the consent of a creditor holding a lien upon such
property, if the proceeds to be derived from the sale will satisfy in full the creditor's claim or the
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(v) to seek separate classification of its claim for plan purposes and to
vote against the debtor's plan of reorganization. 39
Many Second Lien Lenders suggest a "jump ball" on these issues,
meaning that the parties should be free to take any position that they
might otherwise be lawfully able to take in the absence of an inter-
creditor agreement between them. In all events, a Second Lien
Lender will argue that its rights should not be so restricted as to place
it in a worse position than it would occupy if it simply released its liens
and assumed the position of an unsecured claimant in the bankruptcy
case. The First Lien Lender will usually insist upon addressing in the
intercreditor agreement basic rules that will apply, between the First
Lien Lender and the Second Lien Lender, in the event of the bank-
ruptcy of the borrower. Failure to reach closure on these issues in an
intercreditor agreement may cede significant leverage to the Second
Lien Lender in the bankruptcy case, particularly at the critical early
stages of the bankruptcy when time is of the essence.40
B. Negotiating Points
1. Consent to DIP Financing and Cash Collateral
° It is a common occurrence in Chapter 11 cases for the incum-
bent (i.e., pre-petition) secured lender of the borrower to offer DIP
financing to sustain the borrower's operations during the bankruptcy
case pending a reorganization or a § 363 sale of assets.4 As a general
rule, such DIP financing is secured by a first priority lien on all of the
borrower's pre-petition and post-petition assets.42 The existence of a
creditor could be compelled in a legal or equitable proceeding to accept a money satisfaction of
its interest in the assets to be sold. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2005).
39. Under Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, secured creditors having liens on the same
property, but with differing priorities, typically will be placed in separate classes for plan pur-
poses. Pursuant to Section 1129(a)(7)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan cannot be confirmed
(other than by a "cram down" confirmation under Sectionl129(b)) unless each class of creditors
votes to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2005).
40. A recent example of a Second Lien Lender's using the leverage of a secured creditor in a
bankruptcy case occurred in In re Tower Automotive, Inc., Case No. 05-10578 (ALG) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005). There, the Second Lien Lenders as a group held approximately
$155,000,000 in indebtedness of the debtor. See id. One of the Second Lien Lenders objected to
the proposed priming of its junior liens absent the provision of adequate protection. See id. A
significant, and costly, negotiation and court proceedings ensued as a result. See id.
41. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
42. Because the Second Lien Lender will often realize considerably more on its claim through
a going concern sale in a Chapter 11 reorganization of the borrower, the Second Lien Lender
will generally be supportive of a reasonable DIP financing arrangement, whether offered by the
First Lien Lender or others. Accordingly, except in circumstances where the Second Lien
Lender perceives itself to be "out of the money" and objects to virtually everything in an effort
to exact concessions in its favor, the Second Lien Lender normally will not oppose DIP financing
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subordinate lien in favor of the Second Lien complicates the process
of obtaining approval for such financing.43 In order for the First Lien
Lender to obtain such a first priority lien, the bankruptcy court must
approve the borrower's grant of a "priming lien" (i.e., one that is se-
nior to the Second Lien Lender's second priority lien on the bor-
rower's pre-petition collateral) to secure the DIP financing4a If it is
prepared to yield to such a priming, the Second Lien Lender may con-
dition its consent upon a requirement that the aggregate of the pre-
petition debt owing to the First Lien Lender and all post-petition DIP
financing not exceed the pre-negotiated cap in the intercreditor agree-
ment on First Lien Lender Debt, as discussed earlier. If those limits
are exceeded, then a portion of the obligations would constitute Non-
Priority Lender Debt and the Second Lien Lender's liens would take
precedence over those of the First Lien Lender to that extent.
Additionally, the Second Lender may argue that the "priming lien"
granted to secure the DIP financing should be senior in priority not
only to the pre-petition liens of the Second Lien Lender but also to
the pre-petition liens of the First Lien Lender. Such a joint priming,
the Second Lien Lender will argue, better ensures that the First Lien
Lender does not offer an overly aggressive DIP financing that serves
only to "push down" (and thereby dilute) the position of the Second
Lien Lender. The First Lender should be mindful of the potential
negative affects that such a structure might have upon its ability to
or, for that matter, consensual cash collateral usage by the borrower in bankruptcy. The tension
that may arise results from differing opinions as to the best method to maximize the return on
the collateral. The Second Lien Lender may believe that a well-orchestrated and prompt dispo-
sition of all of the collateral in a Section 363 sale, in the early stages of the case and prior to a
plan, is necessary to prevent erosion in the value of the collateral as a result of a borrowers
ongoing losses through continued operations. Thus, the Second Lien Lender may desire that the
term of the DIP financing facility be on the shorter end of the spectrum (say, 120 days) in order
to force action by the borrower to initiate and actively pursue a Section 363 sale process.
43. In a syndicated loan transaction, an administrative agent is typically the party to the inter-
creditor agreement, for itself and for the benefit of the syndicate lenders (whose composition
may change from time to time). In obtaining the advance consent to a DIP financing, the inter-
creditor agreement should be worded in such a way that the Second Lien Lender consents to
DIP financing led by the administrative agent and one or more financial institutions (some or all
of which may or may not be parties to the pre-petition credit facility with the borrower).
44. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the parameters within which a trustee (or
debtor-in-possession) may obtain credit secured by a lien on property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 364 (2005). If the trustee satisfactorily demonstrates to the bankruptcy court that the trustee is
unable to obtain unsecured credit, credit secured by a lien on unencumbered property of the
estate, or credit secured by a junior lien on encumbered property of the estate, then the court
may authorize the trustee to obtain credit secured by a "senior or equal lien" on property of the
estate, subject to the provision of adequate protection to the interests of the holder of a lien on
such property. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2005); id. § 364(d).
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"roll over" or "roll up" its pre-petition claims into post-petition DIP
financing. 45
Finally, the Second Lien Lender may condition its consent to DIP
financing on the bankruptcy court's determination that the economic
terms of the DIP financing are fair and reasonable as well as the Sec-
ond Lien Lender's receipt of an adequate protection lien with respect
to post-petition assets. Such a lien will serve to safeguard against any
diminution in value of the Second Lien Lender's liens on the pre-peti-
tion collateral that may result from the borrower's use, sale or other
disposition thereof in the bankruptcy case.46 Any such adequate pro-
tection lien, however, should expressly be made inferior to the First
Lien Lender's pre-petition liens, any adequate protection liens con-
ferred upon the First Lien Lender in the bankruptcy case, and the
liens securing the DIP financing.
0 It is commonplace for negotiated orders approving DIP financ-
ing to include a so-called "carve-out" from the liens and priority status
securing the DIP financing for the payment of fees and expenses of
professional persons retained by the debtor and the creditor's commit-
tee. In some jurisdictions, the failure to make provision for such a
"carve-out" in the proposed DIP financing may result in the bank-
ruptcy court's declining to approve the DIP financing. Accordingly,
the First Lien Lender may press the Second Lien Lender to consent in
45. A so-called "roll over" occurs in a DIP financing when proceeds of pre-petition collateral
received during the bankruptcy case (including collections after bankruptcy of pre-petition ac-
counts receivable) are applied to reduce the pre-petition indebtedness owed to the First Lien
Lender and the First Lien Lender re-advances those amounts post-petition as part of the DIP
financing. As proceeds of pre-petition collateral are so applied, the pre-petition indebtedness is
ultimately paid off and "rolled over" into the DIP financing. A so-called "roll up" occurs in a
DIP financing context when the initial advance made by the First Lien Lender is used to repay in
full all of the pre-petition indebtedness owed to the First Lien Lender. As a result of this "roll-
ing up" of the pre-petition indebtedness into the DIP financing, the First Lien Lender ceases to
be a pre-petition creditor of the borrower and becomes the holder of a DIP financing claim in
the bankruptcy case that is secured by a priming lien on the assets of the borrower and is entitled
to administrative expense priority pursuant to Section 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. It is
not uncommon for bankruptcy courts to look askance at roll ups, except where there is clear and
convincing evidence that the First Lien Lender's pre-petition claim is oversecured (i.e., secured
by collateral having a value clearly in excess of the indebtedness owed to the First Lien Lender).
46. In most cases, the First Lien Lender will have no objection to the Second Lien Lender's
receipt of adequate protection in connection with any priming DIP financing. However, the
First Lien Lender may seek to restrict the scope of such adequate protection to the granting of a
replacement lien and disallow any other form of protection, such as current payments of post-
petition interest and legal fees of the Second Lien Lender, in order to preserve needed liquidity
for the borrower in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Some Second Lien Lenders will push hard
for the right to seek the same type of adequate protection that is afforded the pre-petition liens
of the First Lien Lender, meaning that the Second Lien Lender would be entitled to receive
current payments of post-petition interest accruals to the same extent that such payments were
made to the First Lien Lender.
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advance to any professional fee "carve out" that is negotiated by the
First Lien Lender in the DIP financing order. Without the consent of
the Second Lien Lender, it may be difficult for the First Lien Lender
to obtain court approval for such a "carve-out" for professional fees.
The effect of such a "carve-out" is to layer an amount of unsecured
debt (albeit entitled to administrative expense priority under § 503 of
the Bankruptcy Code) in a position senior to the First Lien Lender
Debt, the DIP financing and the Second Lien Loan, thereby further
diluting the interests of the Second Lien Lender. In exchange for such
a pre-consent, the Second Lien Lender will likely insist that any
"carve-out" be reserved against borrowing availability under the DIP
financing as a means of offsetting the collateral dilution.
0 It is important to understand that, without the pre-consent of
the Second Lien Lender to the priming of its liens in connection with
the First Lien Lender's provision of DIP financing, the bankruptcy
court may decline to approve, or may delay giving approval for, the
financing at the early, critical stages of the case) absent the provision
of adequate protection of the Second Lien Lender's liens. Adequate
protection may be demonstrated by showing that there is a substantial
"equity cushion" in the collateral for the benefit of the Second Lien
Lender that will not be eroded by the DIP financing47 or that the fi-
nancing will preserve or otherwise enhance the value of the collateral
by an amount that exceeds the amount of the priming DIP financing.48
Because a showing of adequate protection may be both time-consum-
ing and expensive, and the outcome of a hearing on such financing
may well be uncertain, obtaining the pre-consent of the Second Lien
Lender to a priming DIP financing is often crucial and should not be
bargained away lightly by the First Lien Lender.49
47. See, e.g., Anchor Say. Bank v. Sky Valley, Inc., 99 B.R. 117, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (stating
that 67% equity cushion was sufficient adequate protection).
48. See, e.g., MBank Dallas, N.A. v. O'Connor, 808 F.2d 1393, 1397 (10th Cir. 1987) (authoriz-
ing use of cash collateral to drill gas wells expected to produce substantial additional revenues);
In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. Corp., 136 B.R. 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (projected property im-
provements constituted adequate protection when increase in rents would increase the value of
the real estate by some $800,000).
49. In the Chapter 11 case of In re New World Pasta Company, Case No. 04-02817 (pending in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania), the second lien
lender objected to the entry of a DIP financing order that, as drafted by the first lien lender,
would have recognized and given effect to the provisions of a pre-petition intercreditor agree-
ment in which the second lien lender waived, among other things, rights to adequate protection
in connection with the debtor's use of cash collateral and the right to vote on a Chapter 11 plan.
The second lien lender argued that the "offending language" in the order should be eliminated
and the right of the second lien lender to challenge the enforceability of the provisions contained
in the intercreditor agreement (which it freely signed) should be preserved. The bankruptcy
court ultimately approved the DIP financing, but embraced the second lien lender's request that
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* Notwithstanding the consent of the Second Lien Lender to a
pre-negotiated form of DIP financing arrangement, the First Lien
Lender should expressly reserve in the intercreditor agreement the
right to provide DIP financing on any other terms that may be ap-
proved by the bankruptcy court. Such a reservation should negate any
inference that the First Lien Lender has limited itself to the terms of
the pre-negotiated DIP financing. While such a reservation of rights is
not usually a sticking point, the Second Lien Lender will also retain its
right to object to any DIP financing that falls outside of the parame-
ters of the pre-negotiated DIP financing.
* If the borrower and the First Lien Lender have not completed
the negotiation or documentation for DIP financing prior to com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case, the borrower's immediate liquid-
ity needs may have to be met through the use of collateral proceeds
securing the claims of the First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender,
including collections on accounts receivable. Without the consent of
all holders of claims secured by the collateral to the borrower's use of
such cash during the bankruptcy case, the borrower is not allowed to
use cash collateral unless approved by the bankruptcy court.50 Any
such approval is generally conditioned upon the provision of "ade-
quate protection" to the holders of liens with respect to the cash col-
lateral. 51 A contested cash collateral fight can be time consuming and
disruptive to the borrower's operations, thereby jeopardizing the pros-
pect for a successful reorganization.
Accordingly, the First Lien Lender will normally push for inter-
creditor provisions by which the Second Lien Lender will be deemed
to have consented to the borrower's use of cash collateral in any bank-
ruptcy case to the extent of any consent given by the First Lien
Lender. In return, the Second Lien Lender will reserve its right to
seek adequate protection against any diminution in the value of its
pre-petition liens on the collateral. Typically, the First Lien Lender
will acquiesce in such a reservation if the adequate protection liens to
be granted to the Second Lien Lender are subordinate in priority to
those in favor of the First Lien Lender. The Second Lien Lender may
limit its consent to the borrower's cash collateral usage to the bor-
rower's adherence to the same Borrowing Base Cap that may have
been negotiated in the intercreditor agreement as part of an overall
its rights to challenge the enforceability of the waivers in the intercreditor agreement be
preserved.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2005).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2005).
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limit on the amount of Priority Lender Debt.52 By the imposition of
such a condition, the Second Lien Lender hopes to prevent any fur-
ther erosion in its equity in the working capital collateral of the
borrower.
2. Second Lien Lender's DIP Financing
* Many First Lien Lenders believe that intercreditor agreements
to which they are currently a party effectively preclude the Second
Lien Lender from offering a DIP financing facility that primes (or is
on a parity with) the pre-petition liens of the First Lien Lender. This
belief may be based upon the mistaken assumption that, if the inter-
creditor agreement expressly states that it is applicable during the
pendency of a bankruptcy case (as many do), any post-petition liens in
favor of the Second Lien Lender would automatically be subordinate
to those pre-petition liens of the First Lien Lender.53
However, the subordination provisions may only apply to the spe-
cific liens granted to the First Lien Lender under the First Lien Credit
Documents and only to the extent they secure the pre-petition obliga-
tions owing to it. Further, the agreement may provide that those liens
of the First Lien Lender are senior only to the Second Lien Lender's
liens under its pre-petition credit agreements with the borrower and
not to any liens of the Second Lien Lender obtained in connection
with any DIP financing under § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
subordination provisions may be altogether silent on the priority of
other liens obtained by the Second Lien Lender, including liens ob-
tained by way of judgment or during the pendency of a bankruptcy
case.
Accordingly, to avoid doubt, the First Lien Lender might seek an
explicit provision in the agreement to the effect that all liens of the
Second Lien Lender, however and whenever obtained, are junior in
priority to the liens of the First Lien Lender. From the vantage point
of the First Lien Lender, the Second Lien Lender should not be au-
thorized to prime the liens of the First Lien Lender (whether those
liens are granted under the pre-petition credit documents or other-
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 36. In The Enstar Group, Inc. v. Bank of New York, 174 B.R. 315 (N.D.
Ala. 1994), the court ruled that a pre-petition subordination agreement signed by one Chap-
ter 11 debtor in favor of a bank with respect to claims that that debtor might hold against an
affiliate continued in effect after the commencement of the bankruptcy case of both the debtor
and its affiliate, with a result that a post-petition loan made by the debtor to its affiliate in the
Chapter 11 cases was junior in right of payment to the pre-petition claims of the bank, even
though the loans were otherwise accorded senior status under the bankruptcy court's approval
order for the post-petition loan.
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wise) until after payment in full of all of the First Lien Lender Debt
(including DIP financing, but excluding any Non-Priority Lender
Debt). The value of such a concession by the Second Lien Lender
should be kept in perspective, however, as the Second Lien Lender
may easily be able to arrange for a priming DIP facility through affili-
ates, clients or fund participants.
* The Second Lien Lender may also insist upon reserving its right
to offer DIP financing, on a priming or pari passu basis, if the First
Lien Lender declines to provide any DIP financing to the borrower or
to agree to the use of cash collateral. The Second Lien Lender ordina-
rily will have a strong desire to preserve the going concern value of
the borrower's business (to the extent that the Second Lien Lender
believes that the business has some going concern value). While the
First Lien Lender will ordinarily be strongly resistant to any pre-con-
sent to a priming lien, it may be persuaded to give its advance consent
in the intercreditor agreement with certain conditions attached, such
as a limitation on the amount of DIP financing that may be provided
(e.g., limited to the amount of the borrowing availability that would
otherwise exist under the pre-petition First Lien Credit Documents),
the current payment of interest on the First Lien Lender Debt, reim-
bursement of the First Lien Lender's expenses and attorneys' fees (to
the extent allowed by the bankruptcy court); and the conferral of a
right upon the First Lien Lender at any time after default under such
DIP financing (with the Second Lien Lender required to give notice of
any default upon which it intends to act) to acquire, at par, the out-
standing DIP financing and related documents from the Second Lien
Lender.
3. Stay Relief
* The First Lien Lender will commonly seek the Second Lien
Lender's commitment not to seek relief from the automatic stay54 ex-
cept in a narrowly defined set of circumstances, including the granting
of relief from the automatic stay in favor of the First Lien Lender. It
should be borne in mind, however, that, if the Second Lien Lender has
already agreed not to enforce its liens at any time the First Lien
Lender is stayed or enjoined from doing so (see discussion above), the
54. Pursuant to Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the commencement of a bankruptcy
case operates as an "automatic stay" of certain creditor actions against the debtor or property of
the debtor's estate in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005). Creditors may petition the bank-
ruptcy court for a termination, modification, conditioning or nullification of the automatic stay,
for cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of the petitioning
creditor. Id. § 362(b) k2005).
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Second Lien Lender's obtaining stay relief would be of no significant
consequence since it would be barred from enforcing its liens in any
event.
4. Adequate Protection
* The First Lien Lender will usually request that the Second Lien
Lender not object to any adequate protection relief sought by the
First Lien Lender in the bankruptcy case, but the reverse is not always
the case. While the First Lien Lender can be expected to agree to the
grant to the Second Lien Lender of an adequate protection replace-
ment lien in post-petition assets acquired by the debtor during the
Chapter 11 case,55 the First Lien Lender may desire to reserve its right
to object to any request of the Second Lien Lender to receive ade-
quate protection in the form of periodic cash payments, for a number
of reasons. First, the Second Lien Lender's liens may have no value if
there is no equity in the collateral, and therefore the Second Lien
Lender would not be entitled to receive adequate protection pay-
ments. Second, the provision of adequate protection to the First Lien
Lender in the form of periodic cash payments will serve to preserve or
build up equity in the collateral for the benefit of the Second Lien
Lender. Finally, a requirement for cash payments to the Second Lien
Lender may deplete needed liquidity under the DIP financing facility
provided by the First Lien Lender.
5. 363 Sales
* As its opening salvo in the intercreditor negotiations, the First
Lien Lender will argue that the Second Lien Lender must give its ad-
vance consent to any sale of the borrower's assets under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code (a "363 Sale") that is consented to by the First Lien
Lender.56 The First Lien Lender may reap substantial benefits from
having such advance consent, as otherwise the Second Lien Lender
that objects to a 363 Sale may be able to delay, through court hear-
ings, the consummation of the sale or potentially block the sale. The
First Lien Lender will likely argue, as justification for the Second
Lender's advance consent, that a sale in the bankruptcy is generally
55. See supra note 36.
56. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee (or debtor-in-possession) to sell
property of the estate free and clear of any lien or other interest in the property if (1) applicable
non-bankruptcy law permits the sale free and clear of such interest; (2) the holder of the interest
consents; (3) the interest is a lien and the price at which the property is to be sold is greater than
the "aggregate value of all liens on such property"; (4) the interest is in bona fide dispute; or (5)
the holder of the interest could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of the interest. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2005).
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subject to competitive bidding, the bankruptcy court will ultimately be
called upon to "bless" the terms of a proposed sale (including the re-
sults of any auction), and, at least in Chapter 11 cases, a creditor's
committee will exercise oversight and have a substantial voice in re-
viewing the proposed auction procedures for fairness.
In addition, the First Lien Lender will direct the Second Lien
Lender's attention to the provisions of § 363(k), which authorizes a
holder of a lien to bid at the auction sale for the property and to offset
its claim against the purchase price (a so-called "credit bid"). This
option to submit a credit bid will serve to protect the Second Lien
Lender from a potential "fire sale" of any of the collateral. On the
other hand, both parties to the intercreditor agreement may request
the other to waive all credit bidding rights for fear that the possible
exercise of those rights in a 363 Sale context may discourage third
parties from bidding at an auction for the borrower's assets.
To the extent that it is prepared to make that concession (which, in
the case of most sophisticated Second Lien Lenders, is certainly not
routine), the Second Lien Lender will likely insist, as a trade off, that
the filing of a 363 Sale motion triggers its purchase option (discussed
below), and that if such purchase option is not exercised, any proceeds
from such a 363 Sale must be used to effectuate a permanent reduc-
tion in the outstanding First Lien Lender Debt (in the same manner
discussed above for pre-bankruptcy sales outside the ordinary course
of business).
The Second Lien Lender will sometimes argue for retention of the
right to object to any 363 Sale on any basis that could be advanced if it
did not have a lien upon the collateral to be sold and was the holder of
an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case. 57 Holders of unsecured
claims in a bankruptcy case may object to 363 Sale on a number of
grounds, including alleged unfairness of the price and other terms of
the proposed sale and, in the case of a proposed 363 Sale of substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets, the alleged impropriety of such a sale
outside of the context of a confirmed reorganization plan.
6. Plan Confirmation
* A dissident Second Lien Lender can make confirmation of a
borrower's reorganization plan in a Chapter 11 case substantially
57. Retaining the right to object to a 363 Sale on the same grounds that could be urged by the
holder of an unsecured claim may provide only marginal leverage to the Second Lien Lender if
the unpaid balance of the Second Lien Loan is not sizeable in relation to the other unsecured
indebtedness in the Chapter 11 case and the committee of unsecured creditors is supportive of
the 363 Sale.
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more time consuming and expensive and may succeed in blocking
confirmation altogether. The plan of reorganization may not be con-
firmed (other than by way of a judicial process known as "cram
down") unless each class of creditors that is impaired by the plan
votes to accept the plan.5 8 The claim of the Second Lien Lender will
likely be placed in a class separate and apart from the claim of the
First Lien Lender, thereby affording the Second Lender potential veto
rights with respect to the plan if its claim is impaired by the plan. A
"no vote" by the Second Lien Lender would force the proponent of
the plan to seek confirmation (by "cram down") of the plan over the
objection of the dissenting class consisting of the Second Lien
Lender. 59
Accordingly, the First Lien Lender may attempt to procure the Sec-
ond Lien Lender's commitment in the intercreditor agreement to sup-
port any plan that is supported by the First Lien Lender and that is
otherwise confirmable. However, it will be a rare case in which such a
concession from the Second Lien Lender will be given. Indeed, there
is some question as to the enforceability of a pre-petition undertaking
by a Second Lien Lender to support a plan that is supported by the
First Lien Lender. 60
0 It is possible that, pursuant to a confirmed reorganization plan,
new debt instruments will be issued to both the First Lien Lender and
the Second Lien Lender to evidence a restructuring of the payment
terms of the First Lien Lender Debt and Second Lien Loan. Both
parties may wish to provide that, if such debt instruments continue to
be secured by assets of the reorganized debtor, the provisions of the
intercreditor agreement will remain effective to govern their rights,
priorities and duties in respect of such liens.
7. Reinstatement
* The First Lien Lenders should be mindful of the fact that, after
what it expects to be final payment of the First Lien Lender Debt,
some or all of the payments made to it might be recaptured as prefer-
ential or otherwise voidable transfers. The First Lien Lender, there-
fore, would be well advised to attempt to include in the intercreditor
agreement a stipulation to the effect that, if it is required to disgorge
any payment received and applied to Priority Lender Debt, the
amount of the Priority Lender Debt will be revived to the extent of
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2005).
59. See id. § 1129(b) (2005).
60. See supra note 36.
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such disgorgement and will be entitled to the benefit of all of the
terms of the intercreditor agreement. 61
8. Enforceability
* There is scant case law addressing the enforceability in bank-
ruptcy of many of the issues discussed in this section of the article.
Section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a "subordination
agreement" is enforceable in a bankruptcy case to the same extent
that such agreement would be enforceable under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law. A plausible reading of Section 510(a) is that the term
"subordination agreement" includes lien subordination agreements as
well as debt subordinations (as to which the cases are clear that Sec-
tion 510(a) is applicable). 62
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a bankruptcy court would give effect
to every provision in the agreement, particularly if the court were to
conclude that a provision violated some fundamental policy of the
Bankruptcy Code.63 For example, in the context of debt subordina-
tions, the courts have divergent views on the enforceability of provi-
sions that empower the senior creditor to vote the junior creditor's
claim with respect to a reorganization plan.64 There does not appear
61. A more difficult question to be resolved in the intercreditor agreement is whether the
Second Lien Lender is obliged to remit to the First Lien Lender any proceeds of the collateral
that were received by the Second Lien Lender after the discharge of the Priority Lender Debt
but before the First Lien Lender is required to disgorge a preferential or otherwise voidable
payment.
62. See Goldstein, supra note 9, § 6.03[2]. The bankruptcy court in Citibank, N.A. v. Smith
Jones, Inc., 17 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) concluded that an intercreditor subordina-
tion agreement by which one creditor agreed to subordinate its liens in favor of a bank was
effective under Section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to advances made by the
bank to the debtor during the pendency of the debtor's bankruptcy case, even though the agree-
ment was silent as to the applicability of the lien subordination to advances made to the debtor
after bankruptcy. See also, In re Mihalko, 87 B.R. 357, 360 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (a pre-peti-
tion agreement between first and second lenders, that the second lender's mortgage would be
recorded first, qualified as a valid "subordination agreement" under applicable state law and
such a subordination agreement was enforceable under Section 510(a)); see also, In re Cormarc,
Inc., 29 B.R. 569, 571 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (giving effect to the terms of a pre-petition lien
subordination agreement under Section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code).
63. See Jo Ann J. Brighton, Second-Lien Financings: Enforcement of Intercreditor Agreements
in Bankruptcy Part I: More Questions than Answers, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. No. 1, at 38
(wherein the authors question whether the bankruptcy court might decline to enforce certain
provisions of lien subordination agreements, either on the grounds that the resolution of the
particular inter-creditor dispute did not affect the administration of the case or the enforcement
might violate some fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Code).
64. Compare In re 203 N. LaSalle Street P'ship, 246 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)
(Section 510(a) does not allow for waiver of voting rights by junior creditors), and In re Hart Ski
Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (rejecting senior creditor's argument that
junior creditor was not authorized, by virtue of the subordination agreement, to seek adequate
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to be any sound justification for a court to decline to enforce the terms
of a freely negotiated pre-petition intercreditor agreement between
sophisticated parties, especially when those agreements merely estab-
lish lien priorities and embody waivers or deferrals of certain known
rights and remedies of the Second Lien Lender. However, to the ex-
tent provisions in these agreements adversely impact fundamental
rights of the debtor in a bankruptcy case or the rights of other credi-
tors generally, a bankruptcy court may be inclined to find a basis for
refusing to enforce such provisions. 65
VII. SECOND LIEN LENDER'S PURCHASE OPTION
A. Overview
Many Second Lien Lenders will bargain hard for the inclusion in
the intercreditor agreement of an option to purchase the First Lien
Lender Debt upon the occurrence of certain triggering events, such as
the bankruptcy of the borrower, the commencement by the First Lien
protection or lifting of the automatic stay), with In re Inter Urban Broadcasting of Cincinnati,
Inc., 1994 WL 646176, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 1994) (sanctioning senior creditor's voting of
junior's claim), and In re Curtis Center L.P., 192 B.R. 648, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (uphold-
ing senior's right to vote junior's claim on plan of reorganization, despite absence of any provi-
sion in the plan for payment on the junior's claim). See also, In re Davis Broadcasting, Inc., 169
B.R. 229 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994). The courts rejecting the enforceability of a junior creditor's
waiver of rights afforded in the Bankruptcy Code appear to do so based upon a literal reading of
sections of the Bankruptcy Code that require such rights to be protected. Those courts that
uphold the enforceability of junior's waiver of rights appear to give more weight to freedom of
contract between the parties. It is possible to explain the rulings in the anti-waiver cases by
noting the potentially adverse effect of the waiver upon the rights of the debtor and other
creditors.
65. To be distinguished from pre-petition waivers by a creditor of its protections under the
Bankruptcy Code are pre-petition waivers made by a debtor, which, if given effect, may have an
adverse impact not only upon the debtor's estate in bankruptcy but also upon the rights and
recoveries of other creditors. Bankruptcy courts have had conflicting views on the enforceability
of pre-petition waivers by debtors of the benefits of the automatic stay and consent to a secured
creditor's obtaining relief from the automatic stay in event of a subsequent bankruptcy case.
Compare In re Excelsior Henderson Motorcycle Mfg. Co., 273 B.R. 920, 924 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2002) (enforcing stay waiver), In re Club Tower, L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991
(holding that pre-petition stay waivers are enforceable in a single-asset real estate cases), and In
re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1994) (stating that enforcement of a stay waiver in a
forbearance agreement is to further the public policy and encouraging of out-of-court restructur-
ing and settlements), with In re Desai, 282 B.R. 527, 533 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) (declining to
enforce stay waiver due to potential equity in collateral); In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 484 (D.
Mass. 1994) ("the waiver is a primary element to be considered in determining if cause exists for
relief from the automatic stay ... [h]owever, the existence of the waiver does not preclude third
parties, or the debtor, from contesting the motion."), Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey
Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stay serves the interests of both debtors and creditors
and may not be waived nor its scope limited by a debtor), and Ostano Commerzanstalt v.
Telewide Systems, Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2nd Cir. 1986) (debtor may not waive automatic stay
without authorization of bankruptcy court).
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Lender of its lien enforcement rights, or the requirement by the First
Lien Lender that the Second Lien Lender release its liens on certain
collateral not already contemplated by the Second Lien Credit Docu-
ments.66 The Second Lien Lender's request to include a purchase op-
tion is generally acceded to by the First Lien Lender. However, there
are several nuances to a purchase option that need to be considered
carefully by both the First Lien Lender and Second Lien Lender.
B. Negotiating Points
1. Triggering the Option
* An initial question to be addressed by the parties regards the
circumstances that will trigger the right to exercise an option to
purchase. As a general rule, those circumstances will include (i) the
Second Lien Lender's receipt of notice of the First Lien Lender's in-
tent to commence a lien enforcement action (which notice the First
Lien Lender will usually agree to give except in those circumstances
that constitute "exigent circumstances" 67 or where applicable law
might otherwise dispense with any obligation to provide notice68 );
(ii) the Second Lien Lender's receipt of a request from the First Lien
Lender for the Second Lien Lender to release its liens on collateral in
connection with a disposition of collateral that is not otherwise con-
templated by the Second Lien Credit Documents; and (iii) the First
Lien Lender's refusal to consent to the use of cash collateral by the
borrower in connection with the Second Lien Lender's provision of
DIP financing in a bankruptcy case. In some transactions, the Second
Lien Lender may successfully negotiate for an option to purchase in
the event of the borrower's bankruptcy. Except in those circum-
stances where the First Lien Lender may desire to retain the credit
facility, such a provision may not be objectionable.
* A provision should be added to this section of the intercreditor
agreement to clarify that the option to purchase in favor of the Second
66. In the view of some Second Lien Lenders, the inclusion of a purchase option in the inter-
creditor agreement is not so critical, as they believe that a First Lien Lender, confronted with a
troubled loan, will almost always be receptive to selling its claim.
67. The term "exigent circumstances" ordinarily would be defined to mean events or condi-
tions of such immediacy and urgency that the First Lien Lender should be excused from provid-
ing prior or concurrent notice of intended enforcement action. Such events or conditions might
include waste or concealment of collateral, attachment or execution upon such collateral by third
party judgment creditors, fraudulent concealment or removal of collateral, waste or failure to
maintain insurance.
68. Under U.C.C. § 9-611(b), prior notice of a secured party's disposition of collateral after
default is dispensed with if the collateral is "perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value
or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market." U.C.C. § 9-611(b) (2005).
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Lien Lender does not preclude the First Lien Lender (or any syndi-
cate member in the First Lien Lender's credit relationship with the
borrower) from selling its position to a third party prior to the Second
Lien Lender's option notice, subject to the such third party's being
bound by the intercreditor agreement as a successor or assign.
2. Option Exercise Period
* The First Lien Lender will wish to require the Second Lien
Lender to "fish or cut bait" on the purchase option within a relatively
short period of time after the occurrence of an option triggering event
(say, five to 10 days). The First Lien Lender will commonly require
that the Second Lien Lender give the First Lien Lender written notice
of the exercise of the election within the required period of time (fail-
ing which, the option expires as to that triggering event). If the Sec-
ond Lien Lender elects to exercise the option, the closing on the
option should occur within some relatively short time frame (say, five
to 10 days at the outside) after the giving of the option notice. The
Second Lien Lender's obligation to consummate the purchase after its
notice of intent to exercise the option should be irrevocable. Depend-
ing upon the identity of the Second Lien Lender, the First Lien
Lender may want some confirmation of the Second Lien Lender's fi-
nancial ability to consummate the sale at the time of notification of its
exercise of the option.
* The Second Lien Lender may request that the First Lien Lender
agree not to take (or to continue) any lien enforcement action during
the period between the date that the Second Lien Lender gives notice
of its exercise of the purchase option and the date of closing. While
the First Lien Lender may be amenable to such a standby, absent exi-
gent circumstances, 69 the willingness of the First Lien Lender to for-
bear from exercising remedies may be dependent upon the length of
the period given to the Second Lien Lender to close on the option.70
69. See supra note 67.
70. It is appropriate to point out at this juncture the importance of defining what constitutes
an "enforcement action" or a "lien enforcement action" under the intercreditor agreement. The
First Lien Lender will want to carve out from that definition actions taken by it in the ordinary
course of administering its loans, such as reductions in advance rates, imposition of reserves
against borrowing availability, collection of accounts receivable through lockboxes or other
means (short of notification as part of a collection action), offsets for customary fees and charges
in connection with bank products, the imposition of a default rate of interest or late charges, the
cessation of lending, demand for payment of any obligations payable on demand and the filing of
a proof of claim in any insolvency proceeding.
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3. Option Price
* The next issue pertains to the option price and the claims of the
First Lien Lender that are to be assigned upon the exercise of the
option. The price should be 100% of all non-contingent obligations
that comprise the Priority Lender Debt and the depositing of cash
collateral in an amount equal to 105% of all contingent obligations
represented by letters of credit that constitute Priority Lender Debt.
Bank product obligations, to the extent constituting Priority Lender
Debt, should also be the subject of either a cash payment or a cash
deposit as security for payment.71 If prepayment premiums and termi-
nation charges have not already been excluded from the definition of
Priority Lender Debt, the Second Lien Lender will likely require that
the purchase price not include those components of First Lien Lender
Debt.72 The amount of Non-Priority Lender Debt should be excluded
from the purchase price and such debt typically is retained by the First
Lien Lender. 73
4. Treatment of Non-Priority Lender Debt
* The First Lien Lender will bargain to include provisions in the
intercreditor agreement to the effect that the liens acquired by the
Second Lien Lender in connection with the purchase will continue to
secure Non-Priority Lender Debt as well as any indemnity amounts
that become due and payable to the First Lien Lender after the
purchase. Such Non-Priority Lender Debt would only be paid after
payment in full of the Second Lien Loan as well as the Priority Lender
Debt acquired by the Second Lien Lender pursuant to the exercise of
71. Certain bank product obligations may be both contingent and unliquidated in amount,
such as obligations that arise from the liquidation of a hedging arrangement. Whether or not the
parties are able to agree upon a calculus for estimating the potential amount of bank product
obligations, the First Lien Lender may wish to make clear in the intercreditor agreement, with
the consent of the borrower, that it will no longer have any obligation to provide banking ser-
vices after the exercise of the purchase option.
72. The First Lien Lender should be mindful of the possibility of collusion between the bor-
rower and Second Lien Lender in effectuating a termination of the First Lien Lender's credit
facility, without prepayment fees or termination charges that would otherwise be payable under
the First Lien Credit Documents. If the events that trigger the purchase option in favor of the
Second Lien Lender are narrowly drawn and confined to post-default circumstances, the First
Lien Lender may welcome a takeout of its position by the Second Lien Lender's exercise of the
purchase option.
73. On occasion, the Second Lien Lender will attempt to negotiate a right to purchase the
entirety of the First Lien Lender Debt, including all Non-Priority Lender Debt, for a purchase
price equal to the Priority Lender Debt only. The more common convention, however, is for the
Second Lien Lender to acquire only what it is willing to pay for, and typically the Second Lien
Lender is only willingly to pay for the amount of the First Lien Lender Debt that does not
exceed the Priority Lender Debt.
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the purchase option. If agreed to, such a provision would constitute
the Second Lien Lender as the collateral agent for the First Lien
Lender and may limit the Second Lien Lender's flexibility in adminis-
tering its lending relationship with the borrower at a time when the
borrower is in default or in difficult financial circumstances. Accord-
ingly, the Second Lien Lender may insist upon broad rights to deal
with the collateral and to release liens in connection with enforcement
actions and liquidation sales.
5. Effect on Indemnities of First Lien Lender
* A critical area of concern for the First Lien Lender in connec-
tion with the sale of the Priority Lender Debt and assignment of the
First Lien Credit Documents is the effect that such a sale will have on
its right to ongoing indemnifications from the borrower for pre-assign-
ment acts, events or transactions, whether or not any claim giving rise
to such right of indemnification has been asserted by the time of the
option exercise. To that end, the First Lien Lender will call upon both
the Second Lien Lender and the borrower to agree that, notwithstand-
ing the sale and assignment of the Priority Lender Debt and First Lien
Credit Documents to the Second Lien Lender, all indemnities in the
First Lien Credit Documents will continue in full force and effect for
the benefit of the First Lien Lender. To the extent that any claim
giving rise to a right of indemnity exists on or before the date of pro-
posed sale pursuant to the purchase option, the First Lien Lender may
argue that all liquidated amounts associated with such a claim, as well
as all reasonably estimated costs and expenses to be incurred in the
future, should be part of the purchase price or otherwise reserved for
by the Second Lien Lender.
In some cases, the First Lien Lender will be successful in negotiat-
ing a requirement that proceeds of collateral be used to pay any in-
demnity claims that are outstanding and identified to the Second Lien
Lender at the time of its exercise of the purchase option, despite the
exercise of the purchase option and the assignment of all of the First
Lien Credit Documents to the Second Lien Lender. In other cases,
the First Lien Lender may negotiate for a set aside of a specific dollar
amount to be held as security for the payment of indemnity claims
that may arise in the future.
6. Bank Products
* To the extent that bank products made available under a syndi-
cated facility by affiliates of the lenders are part of the secured obliga-
tions under the First Lien Credit Documents, care must be taken to
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carve those bank products out of the description of obligations that
may be assigned pursuant to the option exercise. The syndicate agent
may not have any authority to obligate those affiliates to sell their
bank product claims, even for cash at par. However, to the extent that
such bank products are not included as part of the sale, the Second
Lien Lender will likely insist that those bank products do not enjoy
the benefit of the liens under the First Lien Credit Documents to be
assigned by the First Lien Lender or, if they do, that they are last to be
paid in the waterfall of collateral proceeds.
7. Limited Recourse Sale
* The transfer or assignment by the First Lien Lender pursuant to
the exercise of the purchase option is customarily made without repre-
sentation or warranty and without recourse, except for breach of spe-
cific warranties contained in the assignment that deal with the amount
of the indebtedness and the authority of the First Lien Lender to as-
sign the Priority Lender Debt and related documentation.
74
8. Assignee's Assumption
* The intercreditor agreement will commonly provide that, effec-
tive immediately upon the consummation of the purchase, any admin-
istrative or collateral agent for the First Lien Lender may resign, with
the Second Lien Lender (or its designee) to be substituted in that po-
sition. In addition, the agreement will often specify that the Second
Lien Lender will be deemed to have assumed all "going forward" obli-
gations of the First Lien Lender (and those of any collateral or admin-
istrative agent for the First Lien Lender) and all antecedent
contractual undertakings (such as those incurred pursuant to guaran-
ties or indemnities given by the First Lien Lender to third parties).
The Second Lien Lender will expressly exclude assumption of any lia-
bilities arising out of tortious or other actionable conduct of the First
Lien Lender. As discussed below, the borrower should be called upon
to give its consent to the intercreditor agreement, including the provi-
74. If the First Lien Credit Documents represent a syndicated facility with multiple lenders,
the First Lien Credit Documents should specifically authorize the administrative agent for the
First Lien Lenders to enter into the intercreditor agreement, and to bind all of the First Lien
Lenders to the terms of the intercreditor agreement, including terms requiring the sale of all of
the First Lien Lender's rights and claims under the First Lien Credit Documents. In addition, if
a syndicated facility includes an agreed upon form for the assignment by each lender of its com-
mitments and outstandings under the First Lien Credit Documents, the intercreditor agreement
should provide that the assignment to the Second Lien Lender will be effective under the terms
provided in the form attached to the First Lien Credit Documents or pursuant to another mutu-
ally agreed upon document.
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sions that deal with the purchase option and that provide that the First
Lien Lender ceases to have any obligations to the borrower under the
First Lien Credit Documents after the closing on the purchase option.
VIII. AMENDMENTS TO CREDIT DOCUMENTS
A. Overview
The purpose of this part of the intercreditor agreement is to make
clear, in circumstances where the First Lien Lender and Second Lien
Lender have separate credit documentation with the borrower, that
either lender may (subject to certain exceptions) amend, modify or
waive provisions of those credit documents without the need to obtain
the other lender's consent and without being deemed to have
breached or tortiously interfered with negative covenants in the credit
documents of the other lender. Any requirement for the giving of
notice or obtaining of consents to amendments will generally be obli-
gations that are binding only on the borrower and not the other
lender.
B. Negotiating Points
1. Amendments of Second Lien Credit Documents
* The First Lien Lender will include in the First Lien Credit Docu-
ments specific covenants requiring notice of any proposed amend-
ments or modifications to, or waivers of provisions or defaults under,
the Second Lien Credit Documents. Further, the First Lien Credit
Documents will almost invariably disallow the borrower from entering
into amendments to the Second Lien Credit Documents that would
have potentially undesirable effects upon the borrower or the First
Lien Lender's position. For example, the First Lien Credit Docu-
ments likely will forbid the borrower from (i) shortening the maturity
of the Second Lien Loan; (ii) agreeing to increase the amount of the
Second Lien Loan or the amount of any scheduled amortization with
respect to the Second Lien Loan; (iii) increasing the rate of interest
payable on the Second Lien Loan (other than as contemplated by the
Second Lien Credit Documents at the time of the intercreditor agree-
ment); (iv) making more onerous any provisions in the Second Lien
Credit Documents dealing with defaults, financial covenants or per-
mitted asset dispositions; and (v) prepaying the Second Lien Loan
other than mandatory prepayments as provided in the Second Lien
Credit Documents at closing. Not infrequently, the Second Lien
Lender will resist any attempt to make those agreements binding
upon it in the intercreditor agreement and will argue that those re-
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strictions should be confined to the First Lien Credit Documents, with
the result that any violation thereof will constitute an event of default
under the First Lien Credit Documents.
2. Amendments of First Lien Credit Documents
* The Second Lien Lender can be expected to negotiate for cer-
tain restrictions in the intercreditor agreement on the right of the First
Lien Lender to amend or otherwise modify its credit documents with
the borrower. 75 Among other things, the Second Lien Lender will
seek to restrain the First Lien Lender from making changes to the
First Lien Credit Documents that would (i) increase advance rates;
(ii) alter eligibility criteria (while conceding the First Lien Lender's
authority and discretion to determine eligibility generally); (iii) add
different types of property to the list of eligible collateral for borrow-
ing base purposes; (iv) release availability reserves (which normally
should be restricted to standard reserves, such as reserves for letter of
credit obligations and bank products); (v) alter provisions requiring
mandatory prepayments of the First Lien Lender's term loan; or
(vi) increase the required amortization of such term loan. 76
The First Lien Lender will be especially sensitive to restrictions on
its right to administer its revolving credit facility with the borrower,
but can be expected to make certain concessions to the Second Lien
Lender. In all events, the First Lien Lender should be careful that it
reserves the right to (i) determine eligibility of all borrowing base col-
lateral; (ii) establish additional availability reserves (and eliminate any
such additional reserves); (iii) increase the amount of existing
reserves; (iv) increase advance rates on eligible collateral to a level
existing at the time of the intercreditor agreement if those advance
rates were previously reduced; and (v) forbear after default from re-
75. At first blush, it would appear contradictory for the Second Lien Lender to object to the
inclusion in the intercreditor agreement of restrictions on its right to enter into amendments to
the Second Lien Credit Documents with the borrower while insisting that restrictions on the
First Lien Lender's right to enter into amendments be regulated by the intercreditor agreement.
While the disparity of treatment may offend the First Lien Lender's sense of equal treatment,
the difference in treatment has some justification. If the borrower breaches a negative covenant
in the First Lien Credit Documents prohibiting certain amendments to the Second Lien Credit
Documents, the First Lien Lender's collateral position is not eroded as a result of that action and
the First Lien Lender retains its right to call its loans and enforce its liens. On the other hand, if
the borrower enters into amendments to the First Lien Credit Documents in a manner that
violates the Second Lien Credit Documents, the Second Lien Lender may suffer immediate
harm and may have no viable remedy to redress that harm. Hence, the Second Lien Lender
desires to have the First Lien Lender "on the hook" in the intercreditor agreement as a means of
assuring that potentially damaging amendments are not entered into with the borrower.
76. All of the enumerated restrictions are designed to prevent a dilution in the equity in the
collateral for the benefit of the Second Lien Lender.
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quiring amortization on the First Lien Lender's term loan. This latter
provision may be difficult to negotiate unless the First Lien Lender
agrees that such a forbearance will trigger the commencement of a




Most Second Lien Lenders are altogether unwilling to subordinate
the payment of the Second Lien Loan to the payment of the First Lien
Lender Debt. Indeed, most Second Lien Lenders insist upon inclu-
sion in the intercreditor agreement of an express acknowledgment to
the effect that nothing in it is to be construed as a debt (or payment)
subordination. In contrast to a debt subordination, a lien subordina-
tion merely adjust the priorities of the respective liens of the parties
and generally provides for a standstill as to lien enforcement rights of
the holder of the junior lien. After payment in full of the amounts
owed to the senior secured party, the junior secured party is entitled
to the balance of the collateral proceeds and holds an unsecured claim
for any deficiency owed by the borrower. In a debt subordination, all
amounts to which the subordinate creditor would otherwise be enti-
tled to receive, from any source (whether from collateral, the primary
obligor or secondary obligors) are required to be turned over to the
senior creditor until the senior creditor's claim is fully satisfied.
B. Negotiating Points
* In certain transactions it may be appropriate for the First Lien
Lender to bargain for a concession by the Second Lien Lender to re-
frain from accepting voluntary prepayments, mandatory prepayments
from proceeds of collateral dispositions (since such proceeds are to be
applied to the First Lien Lender Debt), and other payments that do
not constitute regularly scheduled payments of interest or principal, or
reimbursement for fees and expenses, under the Second Lien Credit
Documents. To the extent that any prohibited payments are received
by the Second Lien Lender, the intercreditor agreement should pro-
vide that they are to be held in trust by the Second Lien Lender and
turned over promptly to the First Lien Lender for application to the
First Lien Lender Debt. The First Lien Credit Documents should
contain similar provisions restricting the right of the borrower to
make any such payments that the Second Lien Lender is disallowed
from accepting under the intercreditor agreement.
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* It is customary for debt subordination agreements to incorpo-
rate the so-called "rule of explicitness '77 by which the junior creditor
agrees that it will turn over all payments that it receives on account of
the subordinated debt to the senior creditor until such time as the
senior creditor has received payment in full, including all interest, fees
and other charges whether or not the same are an allowed claim under
§ 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or other applicable law. It is gener-
ally unnecessary to incorporate the rule of explicitness in intercreditor
agreements where the First Lien Lender Debt and the Second Lien
Loan are separately documented and secured by separate liens
granted by the borrowers.78 The intercreditor agreement will provide
for the disbursement of all collateral proceeds to the First Lien
Lender, at least to the extent of the Priority Lender Debt. After ex-
haustion of all of the collateral, the deficiency claims of the First Lien
Lender and Second Lien Lender will be entitled to share on a pro rata
basis in any distributions made by the borrower in or out of bank-
ruptcy. 79 However, in the relatively rare circumstances in which the
First Lender Debt and the Second Lien Loan are secured by a single
lien in favor of a collateral agent or trustee, incorporation of the rule
of explicitness is warranted.
X. SHARING OF FIELD AUDITS AND APPRAISALS
A. Overview
Some Second Lien Lenders are not equipped to conduct their own
field audits and may not wish to burden the borrower with the ex-
pense of obtaining appraisals that are duplicative of appraisals ob-
tained by the First Lien Lender. Accordingly, a sharing arrangement
may be agreed to in the intercreditor agreement.
B. Negotiating Points
* It is not uncommon for the First Lien Lender to agree to share
the results of its field audits and appraisals with the Second Lien
Lender, subject to the Second Lien Lender's understanding that it has
77. The rule of explicitness is an equitable principle that post-petition interest on senior in-
debtedness takes priority over payment of junior indebtedness only if the subordination agree-
ment "explicitly" addresses the issue. For a good discussion of the rule, its history and the effect
of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, see In re Bank of New England Corp., 364 F.3d 355,
363 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that, after enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, "if the Rule of Explic-
itness retains any vitality, it does so only as part and parcel of state law"). See also In re South-
east Banking Corp., 179 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999) (applicability of rule of explicitness
must be determined under state law).
78. See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 2.
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no right of recourse against the First Lien Lender for any errors or
omissions in those reports or appraisals. Additionally, the Second
Lien Lender should be required to agree to receive and hold all such
reports and appraisals in confidence.
0 The First Lien Lender may wish to exclude from its sharing obli-
gation any appraisals commissioned after default or during the pen-
dency of any litigation or insolvency proceeding, as such appraisals
may constitute protected attorney work-product. The sharing of such
appraisals with the Second Lien Lender may compromise the work-
product privilege.80
XI. SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS
A. Overview
Both parties normally request that the intercreditor agreement be
binding upon successors and assigns so that, in the event of assign-
ment of their respective claims, the assignee will not be obliged to
enter into new negotiations with the other party on intercreditor is-
sues. Furthermore, both parties will desire that successors and assigns
be bound by the agreement.
B. Negotiating Points
* While a successors and assigns clause is customary and, there-
fore, generally not controversial, the First Lien Lender should bear in
mind that, if the agreement is made binding upon any assignee, an
unfavorable intercreditor arrangement might deter third parties from
purchasing the First Lien Lender Debt in a distress situation. Hence,
the First Lien Lender must carefully negotiate the intercreditor agree-
ment with a view towards its potential impact (especially in the con-
text of an insolvency proceeding) on its exit strategy in discounting its
loan to a third party.
* To ensure that a successor or assign has actual notice of the
existence of the intercreditor agreement, the assigning party should be
required by the intercreditor agreement to give notice of the existence
of the intercreditor agreement to the proposed assignee, concurrently
80. See Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F. 2d. 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (voluntary disclosure to an
adversary in litigation defeats the policy underlying the work-product doctrine). Unlike the at-
torney-client privilege, waiver of work-product protection normally does not occur simply by
disclosure to a third party. For a waiver to result, the disclosure generally must be made to the
party's adversary or in such a way that the party's adversary likely can obtain the document. See,
e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Terra Nova Insurance Co., 212 F.R.D. 166, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y.




with the assignment. To bolster that covenant, in the case of the Sec-
ond Lien Lender, the UCC-1 financing statements and other perfec-
tion documents filed by the Second Lien Lender should specifically
state that the priority of liens perfected by such perfection document
is subject to the intercreditor agreement.8' The purpose of inclusion
of such language in the perfection documents is to impart public no-
tice to potential assignees from the Second Lien Lender that the Sec-
ond Lien Lender's liens are junior in priority to those of the First Lien
Lender. The inclusion of such language is especially important if the
liens of the Second Lien Lender are reported prior to those of the
First Lien Lender and, therefore, enjoy first priority status based upon
the public record.
XII. CONSENT OF BORROWER AND SYNDICATE LENDERS
Because the consent of the borrower is likely required for the effec-
tiveness of certain provisions in the intercreditor agreement in which
the consent or agreement of the borrower is mentioned, it is prudent
to have the borrower acknowledge and consent to the terms of the
intercreditor agreement and agree to be bound by those terms. How-
ever, the intercreditor agreement should be subject to amendment
without any consent or agreement of the borrower, unless the amend-
ment directly and adversely affects the rights or liabilities of the bor-
rower. In addition, in a syndicated transaction, the intercreditor
agreement is often executed by the administrative agent on behalf of
all of the members of the lender group. If those lenders are not also
parties to the intercreditor agreement (which may not be practical in a
large syndicate), the administrative agent should ensure that the First
Lien Credit Documents specifically authorize the agent, on behalf of
all First Lien Lenders, to enter into the intercreditor agreement and
that each lender, by becoming a party to the First Lien Credit Docu-
ments, consents to and agrees to be bound by all of the terms of the
intercreditor agreement.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Over time, as the market for second lien transactions evolves and
continues to mature, many of the negotiating points discussed in this
article will become standardized, especially in larger, syndicated trans-
81. If the First Lien Lender is part of a syndicated transaction, the First Lien Lender must be
attentive to the consequences of a syndicate member's sale of its position to the Second Lien
Lender. Consideration should be given to the insertion of a provision in the First Lien Credit
Documents that would exclude the Second Lien Lender (as well as any of its affiliates) from the
class of "eligible assignees" to which syndicate members may otherwise assign their claims.
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actions. Second Lien Lenders that attempt to escape the strictures
that they voluntarily undertook in the intercreditor agreement will
precipitate significant clashes in bankruptcy cases that may spawn ju-
dicial decisions on the enforceability of these strictures.
To the extent that a Second Lien Lender attempts to disavow its
undertakings in an intercreditor agreement, it may find itself short on
second lien financing opportunities in the future. To the extent that a
Second Lien Lender is successful in convincing a court that some or
all of the pre-bankruptcy waivers are ineffective, the market will ad-
just and counsel for first lien lenders will no doubt invent creative
alternatives.
